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Case No. 20110015-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Julio I. Martinez, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for: aggravated assault causing serious 
bodily injury; robbery; two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child; 
and interference with an arresting officer. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motions for substitution of 
appointed counsel, after the court inquired into the complaints and friction between 
Defendant and his attorneys, and found that no actual conflict of interest existed? 
Standard of Review. As applied here, to establish a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment, Defendant must show that his trial attorneys labored under an actual 
conflict of interest, that is, that their "loyalties [were] divided in a way that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'adversely affect[ed their] performance/" State v. Maughan, 2008 UT 27, ^ 26,182 
P.3d 903 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,172 n.5 (2002)). Whether an actual 
conflict exists is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 
22,984 P.2d 382, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000). Absent proof of an actual conflict, 
a trial court's refusal to substitute counsel is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377,381 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is at issue, but the wording of that 
amendment is not determinative. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant does not directly challenge his convictions. Rather, he claims that 
his convictions should be vacated and a new trial ordered because his trial attorneys 
labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected their 
performance. See Br.Aplt. at 29-37. Defendant's crimes, therefore, are not at issue. 
The State nevertheless briefly summarizes the facts as relevant to Defendant's 
claims. Following this summary, the trial court's inquiries into and denials of 
Defendant's pretrial and midtrial motions for substitution of counsel are discussed 
in the Statement of the Case. 
Throughout the night of May 4,2009, and continuing until the early morning 
of May 5, 2009, Defendant was agitated, intoxicated, and bent on punishing those 
2 
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who had wronged him.1 Someone had previously murdered his brother and 
Defendant wanted to "punish[ ]" the killer, R344:174-177. In addition, when the 
brother was alive, Defendant's then-wife Teresa had slept with the brother. 
Defendant felt she needed to "pay" for this transgression. R344:184-185. Despite 
now being divorced, Defendant went to Teresa's apartment that night to sleep, 
rather than driving home. Initially, she did not mind. R344:174-175. 
Teresa lived in an apartment with their two children, nine-year-old Gabriel 
and three-year-old Isaiah. R344:173-174. Teresa told Defendant to sleep on the 
couch and then went upstairs to sleep with her children. R344:175. A few minutes 
later, Defendant came upstairs. R344:176. He began ruminating about punishing 
his brother's killer. Teresa told him to be quiet and the two went downstairs. Id. 
Still agitated, Defendant asked Teresa, "Do you want to see how down I am?" 
and grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed himself in his arm. R344:177. He calmed 
down a bit and left to get cigarettes. R344:146,178-179. 
Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light most 
favorable to the trial court rulings and jury verdicts. See State v. Allen, 2005 UT11, 
^ 2,108 P.3d 730, cert denied, 546 U.S. 832 (2005). 
3 
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Defendant went to a nearby 7-11 convenience store. R343:90. Jose Jimenez 
was the clerk on duty. R343:85,90. Defendant got a pack of cigarettes and a pair of 
scissors and then left,2 R344:90-91; Exhibit 7 (scissors). 
Around 2 a.m., Defendant returned to Teresa's apartment. R344:180. He was 
still intoxicated and asked Teresa to have sex with him, but she refused. R344:184. 
Defendant then said she needed to "pay" for sleeping with his brother. R344:184-
185. He pulled out the scissors, and Teresa asked him what he was going to do. 
R344:185. He replied, "I'm going to kill you/7 Id. Defendant then began stabbing 
Teresa with the scissors over and over again, all the while telling her that she 
needed to "pay" and that "this was what [she] got." R344:185-186. Teresa 
screamed for him to stop. R344:188. Thinking she "was going to die," she curled 
into a fetal position to protect herself, but the scissors' blades punctured her leg, her 
armpit, and her arm. R344:186-188. When Defendant still did not stop, Teresa 
rolled onto the carpet and played dead. R344:188. 
The noise woke up the children. Isaiah stayed upstairs, but Gabriel walked 
down the stairs. Gabriel heard his father scream at his mother, "I will kill you. This 
2
 Defendant was originally charged with stealing the scissors, but that charge 
was dropped before trial. Rl-5,243-46. Defense counsel then successfully argued 
that evidence of the prior bad act should be excluded from trial. R343:6-14. 
Consequently, Jimenez testified only that Defendant "got" the scissors from the 
store. R343:91-92. 
4 
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is what happen[s] to you for fucking my brother." Gabriel also saw his father 
"stabbing my mom." R344:50,105,149. 
Finally, Defendant stopped and left. R343:61; R344:189. Teresa managed to 
get up, lock the front door, and call 911-emergency. R344:189-190. She screamed 
into the phone: "Hurry, I've been stabbed. I've been stabbed. I've been stabbed. 
I've been stabbed Oh, I've been stabbed like 20 times." Exhibit 1 (911 call). Faint 
and numb, Teresa slumped to the ground and handed Gabriel the phone, R344:191. 
Gabriel begged the 911-operator for help: "Could you come over please, my mom 
just got stabbed . . . he's my dad . . . he just left She's bleeding so bad, there's so 
much blood on the ground and she's been stabbed On the arm and the legs... . 
Please hurry . . . she's going to faint. . . she is getting really tired." Exh.l. Just 
before Teresa lost consciousness, she heard Gabriel ask, "Mommy, are you going to 
die?" R343:191-192. 
The police found Gabriel "frozen . . . in shock, [and] unable to speak." 
R343:43. Teresa appeared to be "near death," lying in a pool of blood behind the 
front door. R343:45,47-49,60. Another pool of blood was on the living room carpet, 
where Teresa had played dead. R343:45. Blood was on a window behind the couch 
and the bloody scissors were on the couch. R343:60-61. 
After Defendant left, he removed his shirt and drove to the same convenience 
store he had gone to earlier. R343:94. Jimenez was still on duty. Id. Jimenez saw 
5 
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that Defendant was "mad" and that his hands were bloody. R343:96. Defendant 
demanded that Jimenez turn on the gas pump so that Defendant could put gas in 
his truck. R343:94. Jimenez falsely told him the pump was broken. Defendant 
walked outside, but then came back into the store and warned Jimenez that if he did 
not turn on the pump, he "was going to lose [his] life." R343:95-96. 
Defendant walked back outside, towards his truck at the pump. R344:60. The 
police — who had been looking for Defendant's truck — saw him and ordered him to 
stop walking. R344:60,62. He ignored them. R344:63. The officers repeated the 
command five to six times. Id. Defendant began walking aggressively towards an 
officer, clenching his fist, pointing at his head or neck, and not making a lot of sense. 
R344:64-65,77~78,90. The officer saw blood on Defendant's hands, wrists, and 
forearms and felt "threatened." R344:65-66. Another officer "tasered" Defendant, 
who then fell to the ground and was arrested. R344:91-92. 
Teresa was rushed to the hospital. She believed that Defendant stabbed at her 
15-20 times; seven to eight of the stabs produced physical injury. R344:48,188; 
Exhs.1,9-14,24-25. Teresa had two punctures on her left leg, one that was six 
centimeters long and another that was four centimeters. R344:41; Exhs.13-14. She 
had four or five lacerations on her arm, including a one-centimeter laceration in her 
armpit. R344:33-34,41,48; Exhs.24-25. And she had a small 0.5-centimeter laceration 
at her hairline on the side of her forehead. R344:41,45; Exhibits 9-12. Her leg and 
6 
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arm required surgery; and a year later, she still did not have complete function in 
her hand due to her arm injuries. R344:198-199. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2009, Defendant was charged with Teresa's attempted murder, a first-
degree felony, and with two counts of domestic violence in the presence of Gabriel 
and Isaiah, third-degree felonies. Rl-9,243-246. In the same information, Defendant 
was also charged with the robbery of the convenience store clerk, a second-degree 
felony, and with class B misdemeanor interference with an arresting officer. Id. Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association [LDA] attorneys, Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve, 
were appointed to represent him. R12-13,20,31. 
A. Before trial, Defendant moved for substitution of counsel. 
In the months before trial, Tan and Shreve requested discovery; requested a 
bail hearing; requested Defendant's release from jail for a funeral; represented 
Defendant at the preliminary hearing; represented Defendant at arraignment; 
requested supplemental discovery, including the rap sheets of all state witnesses; 
attended a scheduling conference; moved for discovery of Teresa's Division of 
Family Service [DCFS] records; provided notice of self-defense as required by 
statute; moved to continue the trial to facilitate additional defense investigation; and 
subpoenaed Teresa's DCFS records. R21-26,34,65-66,75-78,82-89,101-103,107. 
7 
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Nevertheless, some two months before trial, Defendant filed a pro se motion 
requesting that new counsel be appointed. R133-135. Defendant complained that 
his current attorneys were not communicating with him and had failed to obtain 
necessary "medical" records, meaning the DCFS records. Id. See Add. A. 
B. The trial court inquired into the complaints and denied the motion. 
The trial court held a hearing on the pro se motion and directly questioned 
Defendant about his complaints. R360:3-23. See Add. B. 
Defendant first complained that his attorneys were not moving to suppress 
his father's statement to the police that Defendant had threatened him the same 
night Defendant assaulted Teresa. R360:9. Defense counsel responded that they 
had reviewed the father's statement, but had found no good faith basis to support a 
motion to suppress. Moreover, the prosecutor did not plan to introduce the 
statement at trial. R360:10-12. The trial court independently reviewed the father's 
statement, agreed there was no basis to suppress it, and found that Defendant's 
disagreement with counsels' legitimate strategic decision did not establish good 
cause to substitute counsel. R360:15-18. 
Defendant next claimed that his attorneys were not adequately 
communicating with him and opined that they would not be ready for trial in two 
months, because they did not have Teresa's DCFS records. R360:9-10,18-19. 
Defense counsel explained that they maintained a log of their jail visits and that they 
8 
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were visiting Defendant more than most of their jailed clients — at least three weeks 
out of four, for at least 15 minutes to an hour per visit. R360:13-14. Counsel also 
explained their efforts to secure Teresa's DCFS records and that the matter was still 
being litigated. R360:14-15,20. When counsel stated that they had explained this to 
Defendant, Defendant admitted that they had, but claimed that it was only because 
he had asked. R360:15,18-19. The court found that Defendant's claim of inadequate 
communication was unfounded and/or resolved.3 R360:19. 
The court asked Defendant and his attorneys if they had any other concerns 
or complaints. They all said no. R360:21-23. The court told Defendant that if he had 
complaints in the future, he should "voice" them, but again stated that there was 
"no basis so far on any grounds" to substitute counsel. R360:22. 
C Midtrial, the defense attorneys disclosed that they felt intimidated. 
A three-day jury trial began on August 2, 2010. R249-252,293-294. Before 
testimony began, the court overruled a defense objection to a jury instruction; 
denied a defense motion to sever the robbery charge from the other charges; and 
denied a defense motion to exclude a police officer's statement that Teresa was 
"delta" — meaning "one step short of being dead" — when he found her. R343:4-6,ll-
12,18. The court granted a defense motion to exclude bad acts evidence involving 
Counsel later successfully secured the DCFS records, but the records did not 
support a self-defense claim, as hoped. R185,191-194,197-211; R343:14-15; R344:241. 
9 
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Defendant's alleged theft of the scissors he used to attack Teresa, his flashing of 
gang signs, and his gang-related tattoos. R343:7,l0,12-14. The court also granted a 
defense motion restricting any reference to Teresa as a "victim." R343:22. And at 
defense counsel's request, introduction of a jail telephone call from Defendant to 
Teresa was delayed until the defense had an opportunity to review it. R344:20-21. 
Both sides made opening statements. R343:31-37. The prosecution began its 
case by playing Teresa's 911-emergency call for help and by questioning the officer 
who first arrived at the scene. Defense counsel objected to some evidence and cross-
examined the officer. R343:40,41-44,47-49,63-65,67-79. See also Exh.l (911 call). 
The next prosecution witness was the convenience store clerk, Jose Jimenez. 
Jimenez testified that on the night in question, Defendant "got" scissors from the 
convenience store and then left, but later returned with blood on his hands and 
threaten to kill Jimenez if he did not give Defendant gas. R343:84-102. 
After the direct examination and outside the presence of the jury, defense 
counsel informed the court that Defendant wanted to know if a plea offer was still 
"on the table." R343:104. An offer was still available: Defendant could plead guilty 
to the two domestic violence charges and a reduced "three-to-five" offense in lieu of 
the attempted murder charge, and the State would dismiss the remaining charges. 
R343:105-106. After discussing the offer with his attorneys, Defendant rejected it. 
10 
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The Court directly questioned Defendant to confirm that he wished to proceed with 
trial. Id. 
Trial continued and defense counsel Shreve cross-examined Jimenez. 
R343:106-113. See Add. C. Jimenez testified that he had seen Defendant in the store 
on other occasions, but did not know his name and had not conversed with him 
before that night. R343:90,107. The defense theory, however, was that Jimenez 
knew Defendant more than he admitted, had given him store items for free, and was 
now falsely accusing Defendant of robbery to cover up his own misconduct. 
R343:109-lll; R345:26-27. In furtherance of this theory, Shreve elicited that Jimenez 
was on felony probation and faced possible violation if he lost his job. R343:108-lll. 
As Shreve questioned Jimenez, Defendant passed her a note with additional 
questions he wanted her to ask. R344:16. Shreve then asked Jimenez if he had 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he and Defendant had engaged in "dozens" 
of conversations before that night. R343:112. 
The prosecutor objected that Shreve was misstating Jimenez's prior testimony. 
Id. But when Shreve attempted to withdraw the question, the court refused and 
directed her to read aloud the relevant portion of Jimenez's preliminary hearing 
testimony. The portion Shreve read revealed that Jimenez had previously testified 
only that he saw or waited on Defendant on other occasions. R343:112-113. The 
11 
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judge told Shreve: "You are admonished that that is an incorrect impeachment." 
R343:113. 
Shreve then asked Jimenez one more question and concluded her 
examination. The jury was excused for the night. Id. 
After the jury left, the judge scolded Shreve again: "You know better than 
that, right?" Shreve responded, "Right." R343:114. Defendant then began arguing 
with the judge. He insisted that Jimenez had previously testified differently, 
asserting that "[i]t says it right here on the preliminary transcripts," and read the 
section out loud. R343:114-115. The judge told Defendant that his attorneys could 
explain why his interpretation of Jimenez's testimony was wrong. R343:115. 
Defendant replied: "Well, I think I'm going to file an ineffective counsel on me then 
because you're not representing—you are not going right through the —." R343:115. 
The judge asked both defense attorneys if, in fact, Jimenez had previously testified 
to having dozens of conversations with Defendant and both said no. R343:115-116. 
Defendant blurted out: "Well, it's right there in the transcript." R343:116. The court 
recessed for the night. Id. See Add. C. 
That evening, Tan and Shreve contacted Judge Hilder, the district court 
presiding judge, to discuss "an issue of concern arising from [the] ongoing trial." 
R344:135. See Add. D. 
12 
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The defense attorneys explained that they were "having some challenges with 
their client/' which included "a sense of intimidation" they felt and a "staring down 
episode" with him, but they "did not discuss what was behind that." Id. They 
"couldn't really articulate what it was, but that there was a sense of being 
compromised in the ability to exercise a judgment they normally exercise or to make 
a decision they would normally make." R344:136. Shreve asserted that this had 
caused her to do "something. . . that d a y . . . that was against an old judge that she 
normally would not have done."4 Id. 
Judge Hilder later telephoned the trial judge to explain that the defense 
attorneys had contacted him. R344:136. See Add. D. Judge Hilder opined that for 
some defendants, an attorney's "gender" was an issue and that this might be the 
situation here. Id. The trial judge understood from the conversation— and from 
subsequent discussions with defense counsel — that the intimidation the attorneys 
felt was not causing them to forego 'Valid and helpful" arguments, but had driven 
them to do things — such as the improper impeachment of Jimenez — that they might 
not otherwise have done. R344:136-137. 
Judge Hilder's conversation with counsel and his subsequent conversation 
with the trial judge were not contemporaneously recorded. However, defense 
counsel later moved to recuse the trial judge —fearing that he might have been 
tainted by his conversation with Judge Hilder — and both judges then recreated the 
conversations for the record. See Add. D. Thereafter, defense counsel withdrew the 
motion to recuse as groundless. R344:138-139. 
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The next day —without the jury or Defendant present—the trial judge 
disclosed to the prosecutor and Tan the gist of what Judge Hilder had said: 
I think the gist of the communications was that. . . Mr. Tan and Ms. 
Shreve feel extremely threatened by their client to the point that they 
are worried about their ability to put on a defense and feel that they 
have compromised perhaps by making some bad judgment calls, 
perhaps last night was an example of one [referring to the 
impeachment], because of the threats — I'm saying threats, but that may 
not be right, but because of the perceived intimidation from their client, 
and were in a quandary about what to do with i t . . . . So I thought the 
first and most appropriate thing to do, [addressing the prosecutors], 
was to make sure that everybody is obviously playing from a level 
playing field and bring these communications to your attention. . . . 
The second is to decide where you [addressing defense counsel] go 
from here. I don't know if you've had any requests whatsoever that 
was after having slept on it, perhaps frustration at the admonishment 
that Ms. Shreve received at the end of the day. 
R344:5-7. See Add. E. Tan represented that the attorneys' concern was not so much 
with the admonishment, but with "our ability to continue to adequately and 
zealously represent [Defendant] in trial." R344:7. The court then clarified that Tan 
was not suggesting that the attorneys had or would neglect legitimate defenses: 
It's your duty adequately and zealously to represent him. And it 
sounds to me, you correct me if I am wrong, it's not that you are 
forgoing legitimate cross-examination, you are not foregoing the — and 
I don't want you to answer this in any way that would invade the 
integrity of the attorney/client privilege or work product, that it's not 
that you are foregoing the good stuff, it's that perhaps his intimidation 
has led you to do things that would otherwise be against your 
professional judgment. 
R344:7. Tan responded: "That's accurate, your Honor." Id. See Add. E. 
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Tan voiced concern that Shreve had not yet shown up in court. R344:7-8. The 
prosecutor opined that if actual threats were involved, the prosecutor had a duty to 
investigate. R344:8-9. The judge replied that only intimation was at issue and 
directed Tan to reject any future improper client demands: 
My sense right now . . . it's more of... intimidation, but that's not the 
point. And if that's the case, Mr. Tan, my initial reaction is, forgive me 
saying this a little bit, but it's —you've got a duty to your client and 
you're also an officer of the Court. And at some point you just call, 
excuse my french, bullshit, and you don't do things like last night. 
Right? 
R344:9. Tan agreed. Id. 
Shreve then appeared. The judge explained what was wrong with the 
attempted impeachment and the unfair impression that would have been left for the 
jury if Shreve had been allowed to withdraw the impeachment question. R344:943. 
Shreve agreed, and the judge expressed respect for her. R344:13. 
Tan opined that three issues were involved. First, the defense attorneys 
needed to "continue to zealously represent our defendant. And because of that I 
can't disclose certain information." R344:13. The court interjected that Defendant 
must be informed that his attorneys felt intimidated, regardless of whether that 
"may be or may not be a breach." Id. Second, Tan acknowledged that the attorneys 
as officers of the court had certain ethical obligations to the court. Id. Third, Tan 
expressed concern for "the wellbeing of my client" and presumptively Shreve. Cf. 
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id. Shreve replied that the prosecutor had agreed to provide more security and that 
she was fine and ready to continue trial.5 R344:ll-13,137. 
D. Defendant again moved for substitution of counsel and after inquiry, 
the court denied the midtrial motion. 
In open court—but without the jury present — the court informed Defendant 
of what had been discussed in chambers. R344:14. See Add. E. 
First, the court explained why it had admonished Shreve the day before and 
reminded Defendant that his own reaction to the court's ruling was inappropriate. 
R344:14-15. The judge further explained that over the night recess, he had reread 
the preliminary hearing transcript and listened to the hearing tape to confirm the 
correctness of the impeachment ruling. Id. 
The court then told Defendant that his attorneys— "rightfully or 
wrongfully" — felt intimated by him, which "perhaps caused them to do things that 
they would not otherwise do as officers of the Court/' for example, the improper 
impeachment. R344:15-16. Defendant initially agreed and opined that Shreve may 
have misunderstood the questions he wanted asked. R344:16. 
But Defendant then began arguing, insisting that Jimenez had previously 
testified differently than his trial testimony. Id. The court explained that if 
5
 Two deputies were placed in the courtroom. R344:169. Shreve had also 
reported to the police — but not to the court at the time — that she had been followed 
home the night before. R361:3-5. She did not know if that incident was related to 
the trial. Id. The trial court learned of the incident after the trial. See Add. H. 
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Defendant wished, he raise an ineffectiveness claim on appeal. R344:16-17. 
Defendant responded: "Well, Fm already going to fill out a motion to—file for new 
counsel based on integrity of counsel (inaudible)/7 R344:17. The court explained 
that because they were in the middle of trial, it could not simply appoint new 
counsel. But if Defendant were convicted, the court explained, new counsel could 
be appointed for appeal, who could then challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel. 
R344:19. Tan agreed that LDA's policy was to appoint conflicts counsel when 
necessary. Id. 
Defendant claimed that an actual conflict existed: 
My lawyers, they feel intimated by me, so, therefore, we have a conflict 
of interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever 
their complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between me 
and the lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you know, 
communicate without me feeling that there's a fear between me and 
them. 
R344:23. The court asked Tan and Shreve if they could still "vigorously represent" 
Defendant, and both responded that they could. R344:23-24. Tan noted that legal 
defenders often have intimidating clients, but still zealously advocate on their 
behalf. R344:24. The court found that Tan and Shreve were "capable of fully 
performing" despite any perceived intimidation. Id. The court also noted that the 
intimidation the attorneys felt derived from Defendant's "own conduct" and 
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warned that Defendant could not "recreate [sic] the situation in which you get new 
counsel by doing that." Id. See Add. E. 
Defendant then argued other reasons why new counsel was necessary. He 
first claimed again that Tan and Shreve had failed to suppress his father's 
statement—a statement not admitted at trial— but this claim had already been 
considered and rejected. R344:25; R360:15-18. He then complained that his 
attorneys had not informed him that the severance motion was denied and insisted 
that he was not present when the motion was argued and denied. R344:18-20,25-26. 
The court told Defendant: "Stop pulling my leg[.] . . . [Y]ou were present when it 
was argued." R344: 26-27. See also R343:6-14. Defendant admitted that he had 
forgotten that he was and attempted to withdraw his motion for substitution: "IT1 
agree to go forward with this counsel." The court responded, "I'm not giving you a 
choice. Your motion is denied." Id. 
When the court again tried to explain Defendant's right to appeal adverse 
rulings, Defendant cut the judge off and accused him of "violating my constitutional 
rights." R344:27. After Defendant then "stare[d] down" the judge, the judge told 
him: "I've tried . . . a couple of hundred jury cases, and I'm telling you that you are 
being as difficult a defendant as any I have encountered[.]" R344:27-28. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. The trial continued without further incident or complaint. 
The trial continued without further incident or complaint. The defense 
actively continued to object to evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. R344:39,43-
51,64-66,71-72,76-81,90,93-97,104,106,108,113-139,148-153,195,204-205,209-221. They 
successfully cross-examined Teresa under rule 608, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, about 
an untruthful prior statement she made to the police in an unrelated matter. 
R344:156-l61,208-209. They explored, albeit unsuccessfully, if Teresa harbored a 
motive to falsely accuse Defendant. R344:162-163. 
Tan and Shreve also twice moved for mistrial after the bailiff overheard two 
jurors discussing why additional deputies were in the courtroom. One juror opined: 
"It's so the Defendant can be detained." R344:164. The bailiff interjected, "[Ijt's 
because we are doing training," and then reported the incident to the court. Id. 
Defense counsel moved for mistrial, but to avoid calling more attention to the 
matter, counsel opposed any questioning of the individual jurors or the giving of a 
"hot patch" curative jury instruction. R344:165-170,227-228. The court denied the 
mistrial motion and reaffirmed that denial when the motion was later renewed.6 Id. 
The defense also moved for a directed verdict on the attempted murder charge, 
which was denied. R344:224-227. 
At defense counsel's request, the juror who made the comment was later 
removed from the jury. R345:7-13. 
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The defense recalled Defendant's son Gabriel as a witness to clarify a point, 
R344:231-234, but called no other defense witnesses. Out of the presence of the jury, 
the defense attorneys explained that they had explained Defendant's right to testify 
to him and that he had chosen not to testify. The court questioned Defendant twice 
to ensure that this was his choice and that he had had adequate time to consult with 
counsel. R344:228-230,235-36. See Add. F. The defense then rested. 
F. Defense counsel successfully argued that Defendant lacked the 
intent to kill. 
In closing argument, defense counsel successfully argued that Defendant 
lacked the intent to kill Teresa, despite Defendant's expressed intent to kill her as 
punishment for sleeping with his brother. R345:20-40. See Add. G. 
Counsel admitted that Teresa and Gabriel's eyewitness accounts established 
that Defendant repeatedly stabbed Teresa. But counsel argued that the medical and 
physical evidence supported that when Defendant stabbed Teresa, he did not intend 
to kill her. R345:21-23,29-40. 
Counsel further argued that Defendant was "so intoxicated, he probably 
didn't know what he intended to do the next minute, maybe even the next second" 
and encouraged the jury to consider this and the emotional upheaval Defendant felt 
over the demise of his marriage. R345:24,31,38. Counsel argued that the attempted 
murder charge amounted to overzealous charging and urged the jury to find 
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Defendant not guilty of that offense and guilty instead of the lesser-included offense 
of aggravated assault. R345:27-29. See also R272,275-277 (jury instructions). 
Defense counsel admitted that because Defendant assaulted Teresa, he was 
guilty of committing domestic violence in the presence of Gabriel and Isaiah —but 
based only on assault and not attempted murder. R345:25-26,37-39. 
Defense counsel also admitted that Defendant was guilty of interference with 
an officer. R345:25. But counsel urged the jury to acquit Defendant of the robbery 
charge, because Jimenez was not credible in that he was a convicted felon and had a 
motive to lie. R345:26-27. 
The jury acquitted Defendant of attempted murder and convicted him instead 
of the lesser offense of aggravated assault. R263-264. The jury then convicted 
Defendant of the remaining charges. Id. 
G. Before sentencing, LDA withdrew. 
Two weeks after trial, but before sentencing, LDA withdrew and a conflicts-
contract attorney was appointed. R303-305. Conflicts counsel moved to recuse the 
trial judge from sentencing Defendant, but the motion was denied. R314-333. 
On October 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive 
terms of one-to-15 years imprisonment for aggravated assault and robbery, to run 
consecutively to each other and consecutively to another sentence Defendant was 
then serving. R335-336. The court imposed terms of zero-to-five years 
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imprisonment on each domestic violence offense, to run concurrently with 
Defendant's other sentences; and the court sentenced Defendant to time served on 
the interference charge. Id. Conflicts counsel moved for a new trial, alleging that 
both trial attorneys were ineffective, but upon further review, withdrew the motion. 
Conflicts counsel then withdrew and conflicts appellate counsel was appointed. 
R337-342,347. A notice of appeal was timely filed. R351-352. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) his attorneys were 
intimidated by him and, therefore, labored under an actual conflict of interest; (2) 
the trial court failed to adequately inquire into this and other complaints Defendant 
had with his attorneys; and (3) the court erred in denying Defendant's requests for 
substitute counsel. This Court should not reach the merits of the claims, because 
Defendant fails to properly marshal the facts surrounding the trial court's factual 
inquiries and its fact-dependent rulings. Alternatively, no actual conflict existed 
and, consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and refused to 
substitute counsel. 
Defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an actual conflict of 
interest. He must show not only that his trial attorneys had divided loyalties, but 
that the divided loyalties adversely affected their performance. Here, neither 
requirement is met. 
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First, the trial court fully inquired into Defendant's complaints with his 
attorneys, as well as any friction that arose from Defendant's actual or perceived 
intimidation of them. The court found that—but for the intimidation—the 
complaints were wholly without merit. As to the intimidation, the court correctly 
ruled, Defendant could not intimidate his attorneys and then claim that he was 
entitled to new counsel because his attorneys were intimidated. The court also 
correctly ruled that regardless of who or what caused the intimidation, its existence 
did not create an* actual conflict of interest here, because it did not cause either 
defense attorney to forgo legitimate defenses or to otherwise act against Defendant's 
interests. At most, it caused one of those attorneys to ask one inappropriate 
impeachment question. 
Second, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the defense closing argument does 
not demonstrate the existence of an actual conflict. Faced with overwhelming 
evidence of Defendant's guilt, his attorneys legitimately chose to concede what was 
obvious and to attack only what they credibly could. The strategy worked, despite 
Defendant's expressed intent to kill Teresa. The jury acquitted Defendant of 
attempted murder and convicted him instead of aggravated assault. And although 
the jury convicted Defendant of robbery, his attorneys actively argued that Jimenez, 
the store clerk, was not credible. As to the other offenses — two domestic violence 
charges and the interference charge —no legitimate defenses existed. 
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In sum, Defendant was fully accorded his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and his convictions should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INQUIRED INTO ALL 
COMPLAINTS AND FRICTION BETWEEN DEFNDANT AND HIS 
ATTORNEYS AND CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT NO 
ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED 
Defendant does not directly challenge his convictions. Rather, he claims that 
those convictions should be vacated and a new trial ordered because: (1) his 
attorneys felt intimidated by him and, therefore, an actual conflict of interest existed; 
(2) the trial court failed to adequately inquire into this and other complaints 
Defendant had with his attorneys; and, consequently, (3) the court erred in denying 
his motions for substitution of counsel. See Br.Aplt. at 1 & 24-37. According to 
Defendant, the " clearest indication of the breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship was counsel's closing argument/7 Id. at 32. 
This Court should not read the merits of the claims, because Defendant fails to 
properly marshal the underlying facts. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, 
the trial court fairly inquired into the expressed complaints and friction and 
correctly determined that no actual conflict of interest or other good cause for 
substitution of counsel existed. The trial court then properly exercised its discretion 
and denied Defendant's motions. 
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A, The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to 
marshal the underlying facts. 
Defendant asserts two fact-dependent claims — first, that an actual conflict of 
interest existed with his trial counsel, and second, that the court's inquiries into that 
conflict were inadequate. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 22, 984 R2d 382 
(recognizing that whether actual conflict exists is mixed question of law and fact), 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000); State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270,273 (Utah App. 1987) 
(recognizing that scope of trial court's inquiry is dependent on facts asserted). 
Because resolution of both issues is fact-dependent, Defendant must marshal 
the underlying facts before he may challenge the validity of the trial court's ultimate 
determinations. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) (imposing marshaling burden on 
appellant). See also Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, ^ 22, 217 P.3d 733 ("Even 
where [a defendant] purports] to challenge only [a] legal ruling, . . . if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is 
extremely fact-sensitive, [the defendant] also ha[s] a duty to marshal the evidence.") 
(citation and internal marks omitted); United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower ML Ponds, 2006 UT 35, \ 38,140 P.3d 1200 ( "Parties seeking appellate 
review must marshal the evidence on those questions that require substantive 
factual inquiry, regardless of whether those questions are reviewed for clear error or 
abuse of discretion."). 
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Defendant recites numerous facts. See BrAplt at 3-23. But he fails to properly 
marshal them. Proper marshaling requires him to amass "every scrap of competent 
evidence" that support the adverse decision and then show why that evidence and 
its reasonable inferences, "even when . . . view[ed] in a light most favorable to the 
court be low. . . are legally insufficient." United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, ^ 
39 & 24; West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991). It requires him to embrace the very position he opposed below and not 
"merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court." United Park City 
Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 26 (citations and internal marks omitted). Because Defendant 
fails to "perform this critical task," this Court should not reach the merits. See id. at 
j^ 27 (recognizing appellate court may summarily affirm for failure to marshal). 
A comparison of Defendant's recitation of facts with the State's Statement of 
the Case readily demonstrates his marshaling failures. Compare BrAplt. at 3-23, with 
Statement of the Case, supra. Although not exhaustive, the following also exemplify 
these failures. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court denied his motions for substitution of 
counsel in a perfunctory manner. See BrAplt. at 1, 24, 35. In support, he 
summarizes the court's pretrial ruling in one sentence —"that [the court] saw 
'absolutely no basis for replacing counsel in this case.'" Id. at 4 (citing R360:19). He 
similarly summarizes the court's midtrial ruling as essentially: "I've been informed 
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by your counsel that they feel intimidated . . . we're going to go forward with this 
trial" and "'[y]our motion is denied/77 Id. at 11-12 (citing R360:15-16,27). When the 
facts are properly marshaled, however, they establish that the court's findings and 
rulings were much broader than this.7 Compare Br.Aplt. at 3-4, 9-13, with State's 
Statement of the Case, supra, at 8-9,12-18; and Addenda B, E. 
The facts, when properly marshaled, show that the court discussed in detail 
each of Defendant's pretrial complaints before rejecting them. The court personally 
reviewed the statement Defendant wanted suppressed before finding there was no 
basis to suppress it and that, consequently, defense counsel had legitimately chosen 
not to file the frivolous motion. R360:10-13,15-18. The court also found that the 
attorneys were in fact communicating with Defendant on a regular basis before 
ruling that Defendant's contrary allegation was unfounded. R360:13-15,18-19. 
When Defendant re-raised the same complaint midtrial, the court did summarily 
reject it. But by that point, the court already knew the complaint was unfounded 
and had seen ongoing attorney-client communications during the trial. R344:18-
19,26-27. See, e.g., R343:104-106 (attorney-client discussion of plea bargain); 
Defendant lumps together the pretrial and midtrial motions. See Br.Aplt. at 
1,23-24, & 29. He does not claim, however, that the trial court erred in denying the 
pretrial motion, but only in denying the midtrial motion. See id. at 30-37. 
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R343:114-116; R344:16 (defendant's directive note to counsel); R344:228-30 (attorney-
client discussion of right to testify). 
Similarly, during its midtrial inquiry, the court initially stated that the defense 
attorneys were "extremely threatened" by Defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 16 (citing 
R344:6). But the court then corrected itself and clarified that no actual threats were 
involved, only intimidation. R344:9. The court also found — based on the attorneys' 
representations and its own observations — that the intimidation had not caused the 
attorneys to forego legitimate defenses. R344:7-9,13,15-16,23-24. Rather, it had only 
caused them to acquiesce to one improper demand: the improper impeachment of 
Jimenez. R344:15-16. The court directed the attorneys to call "bullshit," if similar 
demands arose in the future, and counsel agreed. R344:9. 
Perhaps more significantly, Defendant acknowledges but does not properly 
marshal his own statements and actions that support the trial court's rulings. See 
Br.Aplt. at 4,8-9,11-12. For example, below, Defendant claimed his attorneys were 
not communicating with him, but minutes later, admitted that they had. R360:15,18. 
He insisted that they failed to tell him the severance motion was denied, but within 
minutes, admitted that he had forgotten he was in the courtroom when it was 
denied. R344:25-27. Similarly, after his attorneys disclosed the perceived 
intimidation, Defendant did not deny it or claim that his attorneys could not 
zealously represent him. R344:14-28. He claimed only that because he now knew 
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his attorneys feared him, that fact might impact future attorney-client 
communications. R344:23. But again, a few minutes later, he said he wanted to "go 
forward with this counsel" and, in effect, withdrew the substitution request. 
R344:27. The court, nevertheless, told Defendant that the choice was not his and 
denied the motion. Id. In response, Defendant "starefd] down" the judge, which 
was the same type of intimidation his attorneys claimed he did to them. R344:25,135. 
Which incident prompted and supports the court's observation, that Defendant 
could not intimidate his attorneys and then manipulatively claim that the 
intimidation justified appointment of new counsel. R344:24. 
In sum, Defendant's marshaling failures justify summary rejection of his 
claims. Alternatively, if the merits of the claims are considered, no error occurred. 
B. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, substitution of appointed 
counsel is required only when an actual conflict of interest or 
equivalent good cause exists. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal 
defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel.8 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162,166 (2002). "This right has been accorded . . . 'not for its own sake, but because 
of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.,,/ Id. (quoting 
8
 Other than summarily citing to article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
see Br.Aplt. at 2, Defendant does not raise a separate state constitutional argument. 
See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,291 n.4 (Utah App. 1998) (addressing only Sixth 
Amendment claim, where no separate state constitutional analysis provided), cert, 
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
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United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). Accord State v. Gruber, 2007 UT 50,111, 
165 P.3d 1185. "It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in preserving 
fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 685-686 (1984); and it also follows that defects in assistance that have no 
probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a constitutional violation/' 
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. "As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth 
Amendment violation must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
An exception to this general rule exists, however, when a defendant asserts 
that his counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest, as Defendant does here. 
See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. In such cases, the defendant must show that an "actual 
conflict of interest" exists, that is, a conflict that "adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,348 (1980). Thus, not all conflicts rise 
to the level of an actual conflict. Id. at 348 & 350 (holding that Sixth Amendment not 
violated by possible or potential conflicts). Accord State v. Maughan, 2008 UT 27, f 
26,182 P.3d 903. Rather, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, an actual conflict 
exists only if counsel had divided loyalties at the time of representation that, in fact, 
compelled him "to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his 
client's interests." See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681,686 (Utah 1997). Accord Bredehoft, 
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966 P.2d at 291. See also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 (recognizing that "defendant's 
attorney [must] actively represent[ ] conflicting interests").9 
The Cuyler "actual conflict" standard is often stated as requiring no showing 
of prejudice. See, e.g., Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686; Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 291. According to 
the United States Supreme Court, however, that is not analytically correct. All 
violations of the right to effective counsel require some proof of prejudice: 
Counsel cannot be "ineffective" unless his mistakes have harmed the 
defense (or, at least unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, 
a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is 
not "complete" until the defendant is prejudice. 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 (2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
685). Under a general Strickland standard, a defendant must show both that his 
counsel performed deficiently and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the case. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 165. 
Under the more specific Cuyler analysis, prejudice is not separately analyzed. See id. 
at 171-172 & n.5. Rather, it is treated as an integral component of the actual conflict 
determination; in that, an actual conflict exists only if counsel's divided loyalties 
"actually affected the adequacy of [his] representation." Id. See also Gardner v. 
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 621-622 (Utah 1994) (recognizing that animosity between 
9
 Cuyler addressed the standard to be applied when a conflict issue is raised 
for the first time post-verdict. Its definition of "actual conflict" has since been 
applied to substitution motions raised at trial. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40, H 22 & 28. 
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defendant and counsel insufficient to establish actual conflict; defendant must 
demonstrate how animosity adversely affected counsel's representation), cert, 
denied, 516 U.S. 828 (1995). 
In sum, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel guarantees an 
indigent defendant ''the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who 
demonstrates a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the defendant 
and who will assert such defenses as are available to him under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession/7 Kryger v. Turner, 479 P.2d 477, 480 
(Utah 1971). It does not accord an indigent defendant an "unbridled right to reject 
assigned counsel and demand another/' McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 
1981) (citation and internal marks omitted). Thus, an indigent defendant is not 
entitled to substitute one appointed counsel for another unless "good cause" 
justifies the substitution. See State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah App. 1997); 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272. 
Establishment of good cause is a heavy burden. State v. Pando, 2005 UT App 
384, | 27, 122 P.3d 672. It requires a defendant to show either that his assigned 
attorney has an actual conflict of interest or that there otherwise was a complete 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f^ 30; Scales, 
946 P.2d at 382. This high standard allows trial courts to maintain "orderly 
procedure" by minimizing delays caused by manipulative requests for substitution 
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of counsel. See United States v. Doe, 272 F.3d 116,122 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that 
"courts must impose restraints on the right to reassignment of counsel in order to 
avoid the defendant's manipulation of the right 'so as to obstruct the orderly 
procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice'") 
(quoting Mckee, 649 F.2d at 931; other citations omitted), certdenied, 527 U.S. 851 
(2002). See also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273 (recognizing that courts in considering a 
defendant's request for substitution of counsel should consider potential "for 
manipulation of the system" through delays). 
Here, Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his midtrial motion 
for substation of counsel because: (1) an actual conflict existed; and (2) the court 
failed to adequately inquire into the conflict. Neither claim has merit. Both are 
discussed below.10 
C. The trial court adequately inquired into the complaints and friction 
between Defendant and his attorneys, 
"[W]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court 
'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determined the nature of the 
defendant's complaints.'" Pando, 2005 UT app 384, ^  24 (quoting Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 
If 27). The court should use the inquiry to "apprise itself of the facts necessary to 
In this case, Defendant argues only that his attorneys labored under an 
actual conflict of interest, as defined by Cuyler. See Br.Aplt. at 37. He does not claim 
that his attorneys were otherwise ineffective under a general Strickland standard. 
See id. at 24-37. 
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determine whether the defendant's relationship with h i s . . . appointed attorney has 
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such 
an extent that his . . . right to counsel would be violated but for substitution/7 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. 
The scope of the inquiry is determined by the facts asserted; but this Court 
has cautioned trial courts not to summarily reject even "disingenuous" and 
" manipulate[ive]" complaints without some inquiry. See id, at 273. Nevertheless, a 
trial court's failure to conduct an adequate inquiry —or any inquiry —does not 
mandate reversal. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174 (holding that lack of inquiry 
constitutes harmless error unless defendant shows that conflict actually adversely 
affected counsel's performance). See also Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 27-29 (same); State v. 
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, ^ 13-14,27 P.3d 573 (holding lack of adequate inquiry 
harmless). 
Defendant asserts that before rejecting his midtrial substitution motion, the 
trial court only perfunctorily inquired into his complaints with and the friction felt 
by his attorneys. See BrAplt. at 24, 35-37. Defendant does not, however, directly 
attack the adequacy of the court's pretrial inquiry into his initial complaints. See id. 
He instead uses the initial complaints from the first inquiry— which he re-raised in 
part in the midtrial mo t ion - to allege that the attorney-client relationship had 
deteriorated as a result of his attorneys' fear of him. See id. at 29-30, 35. 
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Nevertheless, the court's pretrial inquiry is illustrative of the court's 
willingness to fairly consider Defendant's complaints. Before trial, the court 
thoroughly inquired into Defendant's complaint regarding his attorneys' refusal to 
file a motion to suppress — going so far as to review the father's statement to confirm 
that no basis for suppression existed. See Statement of the Case at 8-9. The courts also 
thoroughly inquired into the claimed lack of communication regarding the DCFS 
records and found the attorneys had communicated this information to Defendant 
and were regularly communicating with him. Id. And although the court found 
that Defendant's pretrial complaints were wholly without basis, the court 
nevertheless encouraged Defendant to "voice" any other complaints that might arise 
in the future. Id. 
Similarly, just before the midtrial inquiry, the court expended extra effort to 
consider Defendant's perspective of events. For example, when the court ruled that 
Shreve's attempted impeachment of Jimenez was improper, Defendant argued with 
the judge. R343:114-116. Over the night recess, the judge again reviewed the 
preliminary hearing transcript and even the trial tape to ensure that its original 
ruling was correct. R344:14-15. 
During the midtrial inquiry, the court continued to maintain the same fair 
attitude. The court spent considerable time discussing the intimidation concerns 
with the presiding judge (Judge Hilderj and then with the defense attorneys and 
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Defendant. See Statement of the Case at 13-18. Only after these discussions, did the 
court rule that no actual conflict or other good cause existed for substitution. 
R344:24. See also Add. E. 
Below, Defendant never claimed that the trial court lacked sufficient 
information to rule on the midtrial motion. But now, for the first time on appeal, 
Defendant chastises the trial court for not further questioning the attorneys about 
the specifics of the intimidation. See Br.Aplt. at 35. At the same time, he suggests 
that the defense attorneys may have revealed too much in that they divulged 
confidential information that they ethically should not have. Id. at 33-34. 
The record reflects, however, that the trial court and the defense attorneys 
were acutely aware of attorney-client privilege and carefully avoided violating it in 
discussing the intimidation. See Statement of the Case at 14-15. See also Add. E. The 
attorneys never disclosed any confidential statements or specific threats that 
Defendant might have made. At most, they revealed to Judge Hilder that 
Defendant had once stared them down. R344:135. Moreover, even apart from what 
the defense attorneys may have revealed, the trial judge was fully aware of 
Defendant's intimidation methods. Defendant frequently argued with the judge 
over rulings. R343:114-116; R344:16-17,26-28. And at one point, he tried to stare 
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down the judge-just as he had apparently tried to stare down his attorneys.11 
R433:27-28. 
Moreover, during the midtrial inquiry, the defense attorneys appropriately 
focused less on what Defendant did or said, and more on their own feelings and 
reactions. Despite being experienced legal defenders who had previously defended 
difficult and/ or intimidating clients, the attorneys expressed that what they now felt 
was different. R344:7,24,136. Yet, despite these feelings, they said that they had not 
foregone any legitimate defenses. R344:136-137. Rather, the intimidation had only 
caused Shreve to ask an improper question of Jimenez. R344:7,136. But neither Tan 
nor Shreve revealed that the question had come directly from a note Defendant 
handed her during trial. Defendant disclosed this fact. R344:16. And when he did, 
he did not deny pressuring Shreve to ask the question; he opined only that she 
might have misunderstood the question he wanted asked. Id. 
11
 In any case, even if the attorneys had improperly revealed confidences, as 
suggested by Defendant, this alone would not establish a Sixth Amendment 
violation. Cuyler's actual conflict rule is not designed "to enforce the Canons of 
Legal Ethics, but to apply prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is 
evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel/7 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. Consequently, a "breach of an ethical 
standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment." Id. 
(quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,165 (1986)). See also Gardner, 888 P.2d at 621 
(holding ethical impropriety alone does not establish actual conflict unless "harm 
accrued" to defendant). 
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More importantly, the trial court did not need to determine if Defendant had 
intentionally intimidated his attorneys to properly rule on the substitution motion. 
The court only needed to resolve if the intimidation perceived by the attorneys was 
causing them to have divided loyalties that actually affected their performance. 
Knowing what Defendant specifically said or did to the attorneys would not have 
added to the court's understanding of the situation. Indeed, even if Defendant 
intentionally threatened the attorneys, substitution of counsel was not mandated, 
unless the threat caused the attorneys to actively act against Defendant's best 
interests. See Subsection B, supra. 
In sum, the court sufficiently appraised itself of the facts before denying the 
midtrial motion for substitution. 
D. The trial court correctly determined that no actual conflict of interest 
existed. 
As raised here, substitution of counsel was only mandated if Defendant 
established that an actual conflict of interest existed. See Subsection B at 29-32. 
Defendant asserts that an actual conflict existed because his attorneys felt 
intimidated by him. Br.Aplt. at 27-36. In support, he claims that the intimidation 
caused his attorneys not to inform him of the progress of the case, as evidenced by 
their alleged failure to inform him of the denial of the severance motion. Id. at 29. 
He claims it caused his attorneys to make "poor strategic choices," as evidenced by 
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the attempted impeachment and the defense closing argument. Id. at 30, 32. And 
he argues that an actual conflict was evident because LDA withdrew from the case 
before sentencing; Shreve reported being followed; and the attorneys expressed 
concern over whether they could zealously represent Defendant. Id. at 29-31. At the 
same time, Defendant admits he " created these conflicts/7 but argues that fact is of 
little consequence, because he did not" threaten violence or extreme measures/' Id. 
at 31. The claims have no merit. 
i. Defendant's contribution to friction. 
Defendant asserts that courts "frequently" allow defendants to obtain new 
counsel even when the defendant created the conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 31-32. None of 
the cases cited by Defendant, however, support the proposition that new counsel is 
mandated whenever a defendant threatens his existing appointed attorney.12 
Indeed, the law is to the contrary. As the trial court correctly recognized, a 
defendant may not intimidate his existing counsel and then legitimately claim that 
1 7 
See, e.g., People v. Parker, 2002 WL187081 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion noting 
without analysis that mistrial was declared after Parker threatened to kill first one 
and then another appointed attorney); State v. Toste, 504 A.2d 1036, 1046 (Conn. 
1986) (speedy trial case noting without discussion that some delay resulted when 
two successive attorneys withdraw after Toste threatened their lives); State v. Brillon, 
2008 VT 35, f 31, 955 A.2d 1108, (speedy trial case noting without discussion that 
some delay resulted when assigned counsel withdrew after Brillion threatened him), 
rev'd on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009); and People v. Manuel, 39 A.D.3d 1185, 
834 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Sup. 2007) (speedy trial case noting without analysis that 
delays caused by successive substitutions of counsel were due to Manuel's threats). 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the intimidation mandates the appointment of new counsel See Doe, 272 F.3d at 126 
(recognizing that if defendant's threats created actual conflict, defendants would be 
"potentially encouraged... to take such action in the hopes of having an avenue to 
later seek reversal of a conviction"); Scales, 946 P.2d at 382 (holding that "who is to 
blame" for attorney-client breakdown "significantly affects whether the breakdown 
constitutionally requires" substitution of appointed counsel). 
Here, the trial court properly considered Defendant's role in creating the 
friction with his attorneys. R344:24,27-28. As discussed, Defendant never denied 
the intimidation. He also acknowledged that he wanted his attorneys to file a 
motion to suppress — even though he was told the motion was frivolous and the 
statement was not being introduced at trial. He claimed that his attorneys were not 
communicating with him, when they were. And he claimed that he was not in court 
during the severance hearing, when he was. See Statement of the Case at 8-9,18. 
Although Tan and Shreve were experienced and respected legal defenders, 
they found Defendant to be difficult. The judge confirmed this sentiment based on 
his own dealings with Defendant, telling Defendant that he was the most difficult 
defendant the judge had ever encountered. R344:5-7,27-28,135-136. 
But despite these problems, the attorneys continued to actively represent him. 
See Statement of the Case at 19-21. In denying the midtrial motion, the court properly 
considered that difficulties in the attorney-client relationship derived from 
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Defendant's own subjective perceptions of events, and not from a lack of trying on 
Tan and Shreve's part. See Scales, 946 P.2d at 382; Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 (both 
recognizing defendant's subjective perceptions do not create good cause). See also 
McKee, 649 F.2d at 932 (same). 
ii. Defense attorneys' statements and actions. 
Next, Defendant asserts that the defense attorneys' own statements and 
actions establish an actual conflict. They do not. . 
Defendant asserts, for example, that Shreve's concern over being followed 
reflects an actual conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 30. Shreve told the police that she was 
followed home the first night of trial, but she did not report this to the court during 
trial. The court inadvertently learned of the incident from a third person after trial 
and then discussed it with counsel. See n.5 and Add. H. In that discussion, Shreve 
clarified that she did not know if the incident was related to Defendant's trial. Id. 
She certainly knew that Defendant did not follow her, because he was in jail. But 
whatever speculation she may have had about who followed her, she did not let the 
incident impact her willingness to proceed with Defendant's trial. R344:ll-13. 
Following the incident, she continued to actively advocate on behalf of Defendant. 
See Statement of the Case at 19-20. Thus, the incident does not support that an actual 
conflict existed. It only helps to explain why Shreve felt intimidated. 
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Defendant next cites his attorneys' isolated statement that they wondered if 
they could continue to zealously represent Defendant. They, however, repudiated 
this statement when further questioned. The attorneys told Judge Hilder, when 
they discussed Shreve's admonishment with him, that they were concerned about 
their ability to continue to represent Defendant. R344:5-7,136. But upon further 
reflection, they told the trial judge the next day that they could zealously represent 
Defendant. R344:7,13,23-24. Although Defendant suggests that the attorneys7 
opinions should be given little weight, see Br.Aplt. at 33, the judge was entitled to 
credit them. R344:24. Moreover, the record bears out that after this discussion, the 
attorneys continued to actively advocate on Defendant's behalf. See Statement of the 
Case at 19-21. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, see Br.Aplt. at 34, LDA's post-verdict 
withdrawal from the case also does not support the existence of an actual conflict. 
As explained to Defendant during the midtrial inquiry, assigned counsel is often 
changed post-verdict to facilitate raising an ineffective trial counsel claim. R344:16-
19. Here, that is exactly what occurred. By withdrawing from the case, LDA 
allowed new conflicts counsel to be appointed; and new counsel then filed —but 
ultimately withdrew —a new trial motion alleging LDA's ineffectiveness. R337-
342,347. 
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iii. The attempted impeachment and closing argument. 
Defendant further claims that the intimidation caused his attorneys to make 
poor strategic choices, as evidenced by the attempted impeachment and the 
concessions his counsel made in closing argument. See BrAplt. at 30. But neither of 
these choices establishes an actual conflict. 
The trial court characterized Shreve's attempted impeachment of Jimenez as 
improper because she lacked a good faith basis to ask the impeachment question. 
See Statement of the Case at 11-12,15. But the court's admonishment does not support 
that an actual conflict existed, because the attempted impeachment was not adverse 
to Defendant's interests. See Subsection B, supra. To the contrary, Shreve was 
attempting to do what Defendant wanted. And the question she asked was 
consistent with the defense theory that Jimenez knew Defendant better than he was 
admitting and had falsely accused Defendant to cover up his own misconduct in 
giving away store items for free. See Statement of the Case at 11. 
Turning to the closing argument, defense attorney Tan argued that Defendant 
lacked the intent to kill Teresa. See Statement of the Case at 20-21. See also Add. G. He 
also suggested that Jimenez's account of the robbery was not credible. Id. But Tan 
otherwise conceded Defendant's guilt of the lesser crime of aggravated assault, the 
two domestic violence charges, and interference with an arresting officer. Id. 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Concessions of guilt in closing argument may support the existence of an 
actual conflict of interest or a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, but 
only when there was a complete lack of defense at trial. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 
685, 696-697 (2002) (clarifying that prejudice is presumed only "if counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," that is, only 
when "the attorney's failure . . . [is] complete") (emphasis in Bell) (citation and 
internal marks omitted). Accord Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f 32,194 P.3d 913. 
In contrast, where — as here — defense counsel actively participates at critical 
stages of the proceedings, but then chooses to concede guilt in closing, that decision 
is judged under general Strickland standards. In other words, Defendant must show 
that counsel's choice of argument was deficient and that the argument unfairly 
prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 697-699. Defendant, 
however, makes no Strickland argument. See n.10, supra. He claims only that the 
closing argument evidences the existence of an actual conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 32-37. 
It does not. 
It is well-recognized that an attorney who actively advocates for a defendant 
during trial may choose to concede some guilt in closing argument, if in doing so, 
the defense gains credibility or other strategic advantage. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 
U.S. 175,189 (2004) (holding attorney's concession of defendant's guilt in guilt phase 
of capital trial not necessarily deficit). See also Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 295-
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296 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding counsel's decision to make "tactical retreat [but not] 
complete surrender" in conceding guilt in closing argument), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 
1193 (2001); Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 531 U.S. 868 
(2000); Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301,310-311 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding counsel's 
decision to concede guilt to robbery to increase credibility of argument that 
defendant did not kill victim); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473,474 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding counsel's decision to compare overwhelming evidence of defendant's 
guilt of kidnapping to lack of evidence of defendant's intent to rape); McNeal v. 
Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding concession of guilt was 
reasonable strategic decision); and Atwater v. State, 788 So.2d 233,230-232 (Fla. 2001) 
(same). 
This is what occurred here. The defense attorneys actively attempted to poke 
holes in the prosecution's case where they credibly could: they minimized Teresa's 
injuries by eliciting from the doctor the non-critical nature of the injuries; they kept 
out all references to Teresa as a "victim"; they kept out all references to Defendant's 
other bad acts; they attempted to explore the possibility of a self-defense claim; they 
attacked Jimenez's credibility and motive; and they moved for a directed verdict of 
acquittal on the attempted murder charge. See Statement of the Case, supra. In sum, 
the attorneys actively represented Defendant to the degree that they credibility and 
ethically could. See Kryger, 479 P.2d at 480 (recognizing that attorney only obligated 
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to "assert such defenses as are available to him under the law and consistent with 
the ethics of the profession"). This permissibly included their decision to only argue 
what was credible in closing. 
The strategy worked. Despite Defendant's expressed intent to kill Teresa as 
//pay[ment],/ for sleeping with his brother, the jury found that Defendant lacked the 
intent to kill and convicted him of the lesser charge of aggravated assault. See 
Statement of the Case at 21. The jury did not agree, however, that Jimenez was not 
credible and convicted Defendant of robbery. Id. And as defense counsel 
acknowledged and the jury legitimately found, there were no viable defenses to the 
two domestic violence charges and the interference charge. Id. 
In sum, counsels' choice of argument does not establish that an actual conflict 
exists; it negates it. For in conceding some indisputable criminal conduct to gain 
credibility in challenging the attempted murder charge, the attorneys reduced 
Defendant's potential time prison sentence from life to fifteen years. See Bredehoft, 
966 P.2d at 292 (recognizing no conflict exists when attorney and defendant have 
"single, shared goal of [defendant's] exoneration"). See also Doe, 272 F.3d at 126 
(recognizing that defendant's threats towards attorney "would actually cause 
[attorney] to do his best to obtain an acquittal, so that [defendant] would be placated 
and would not cause any harm to befall either [attorney] or his family"). 
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iv. The substitution motion's timing. 
Finally, although Defendant does not discuss the timing of his motion, the fact 
that the motion was raised midtrial further supports its denial. 
"[M]otions for substitute counsel are less likely to be granted when they 
would result in . . . mistrial or otherwise impede the prompt administration of 
justice." See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. Because such motions typically result in 
substantial delay, they have great"propensity for manipulation of the process by 
criminal defendants." Id. Indeed, when a mistrial is declared, there is always a 
resultant possibility that retrial will be constitutionally or statutorily barred. See 
U.S. CONST., amend. V; UTAH CONST., art. 1, § 12 (both prohibiting being placed in 
jeopardy twice for same offense); UTAH CODE ANN. § 764-403 (West 2004) (setting 
forth when retrial permissible after mistrial). See also West Valley v. Patten, 1999 UT 
App 149, \ 18, 981 P.2d 420 (holding that double jeopardy barred retrial, where 
judge erroneously declared mistrial believing that actual conflict of interest existed). 
Accordingly, trial courts are granted great discretion in ruling on midtrial motions 
for substitution of counsel. See McKee, 649 F.2d at 931. 
Here, the trial court properly considered the fact that granting the midtrial 
motion would result in mistrial. R344:16-17,19. The court explained to Defendant 
that it could not simply substitute counsel at that stage of the proceedings since his 
new attorneys would need time to prepare for trial. 'Id. at 19. The court further 
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explained that if Defendant disagreed with his trial attorneys7 strategic choices, he 
could obtain new counsel on appeal and raise an ineffectiveness assistance of 
counsel claim. Id. at 16-17. Although mistrial would have been mandated if an 
actual conflict existed; because no actual conflict was established, the trial court 
properly considered the timing of the midtrial motion in denying it. 
•k k k "k k 
In sum, the trial court fully inquired into the complaints and friction between 
Defendant and his attorneys, correctly determined that none amounted to an actual 
conflict of interest or equivalent good cause, and properly exercised its discretion in 
denying the midtrial motion for substitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted October 31, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
•k Jc * 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to go forward 
in the*matter of State vs. Julio Martinez? 
MS. JOHNSON: We are, your Honor. 
MR. TAN: We are, your Honor. 
This is the State of Utah vs. Julio Martinez. It's 
Case No. 091903723. Will those who are entering their 
appearances do so for the record, please. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandy Johnson and Gregory Ferbrache for 
the State. 
MR. TAN: Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve for 
Mr. Martinez. 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Ms. (inaudible) for the alleged 
victims, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I have received this 
afternoon and reviewed a copy of a handwritten motion for 
ineffective counsel of plan of action to request a new 
appointed IDA on the case in order to allow the defendant new 
appointed counsel on the case as well. You've also seen these? 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I understand that this was set at the 
request of defense counsel. Is that correct? 
MR. TAN: That's correct, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, let's have you come 
2 on up here. 
3 Mr. Tan, I'm going to confess that I've read this and 
4 frankly don't understand it. I want you to enlighten me a 
5 little bit. 
6 MR. TAN: All right. I can do that, your Honor. As 
7 far as some of the language and the wording I myself am a 
8 j little bit confused as well. And if that's the case I would 
9 ask that the court inquire of Mr. Martinez. 
10 I did get a chance to visit with Mr. Martinez, I 
11 believe it was back on Wednesday of this week. Ms. Shreve also 
12 had a visit with Mr. Martinez last Friday. 
13 And as far as background on this letter or court 
14 document, however the Court wishes to refer to it, this came 
15 I about as of late during one of our visits with Mr. Martinez at 
16 the jail where Ms. Shreve and I were there. We had a 
17 discussion with Mr. Martinez in regards to preparing for the 
18 jury trial. And --
19 THE COURT: I don't want you to waive any privileges 
20 as you are moving along here. 
21 MR. TAN: I understand that, your Honor. 
22 To put it vaguely so to speak, xMr. Martinez did not 
23 like some of the assessments that I gave him and also that 
24 Ms. Shreve gave him in regards to the jury trial, to the issues 
25 in the jury trial. And as a result I believe then this letter 
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came about. 
I also as of last week received a message from my 
secretary while I was in court that Mr. Martinez had called 
inquiring who the assigned attorney was to the case and my 
secretary indicated that it was Ms. Grinly Fair. And it was at 
that time that we realized that Mr. Martinez was planning on 
writing a letter to the court and sending a copy to the State 
and also one to Ms. Shreve and I. At that point because I had 
court on Friday, Ms. Shreve had some free time last Friday, I 
asked her to go down there and advise Mr. Martinez that it's 
not wise to submit correspondence to the State without us 
having looked at it first. And so he was given that 
information. 
It was at that point that Mr. Martinez in 
essence indicated that unless we met a list of his demands, so 
to speak, he was going to send this letter out. So Ms. Shreve 
came back to the office and conveyed that to me. I too then 
went out to visit --
THE COURT: I'm going to stop you. One of the things 
that I've done before in similar circumstances is had this done 
outside the presence of the DA for --in terms of the 
discussions that may have taken place in a sealed filing so 
that counsel can without running the risk of violating the 
attorney/client privilege apprize the court of the 
communications. I don't know how you feel about that in this 
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particular case. Or frankly, if it!s necessary perhaps what I 
ought to do is speak with Mr. Martinez first and then make that 
decision. 
Ms. Johnson? 
MS. JOHNSON: Well, your Honor, with regards to the 
attorney/client privilege, I believe Mr. Martinez is asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel which I believe waives the 
prejudice privilege. So I don't think there's an issue there. 
• As to — and I'll just say this up front. Mr. Tan 
called me indicating that Mr. Martinez was attempting to fire 
him and then asked when we would like a hearing set, if any. I 
asked it be set as quickly as possible because if we are going 
to get new counsel I want to maintain the obvious state we 
have. And so Mr. Tan went to the efforts of contacting 
Christine and she quite quickly put this on for today. So 
that's why we're --
THE COURT: I don't know if it's ineffective 
assistance or not, though, and part of it would be you'd have 
to get into it to figure it out, or whether there's some other 
basis for the request. But let's talk to Mr. Martinez and then 
we'll go from there. 
Mr. Martinez, come on up here. How are you feeling 
today? 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. 
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you need an interpreter? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: How good is your English? 
THE DEFENDANT: Very good. 
THE COURT: What's the highest level of education 
you've had? 
THE DEFENDANT: Eleventh grade. 
THE COURT: So I've received these documents, but as 
I said to Mr. Tan, I don't really understand what you are 
trying to say. Can you help enlighten me? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, well, one day we had a -•-
Patrick Tan, my attorney and Charity Shreve came out to the 
jail. We were talking about my case and I got their attention 
that in my discovery as soon as Detective --one of the 
detectives had hard core evidence stating that I had threatened 
my father. So, therefore, we had went to my father's house and 
the next day after this incident had happened and to talk to my 
father. My father (inaudible) to talk•• to his wife which is Ms. 
Schaefer. And Ms. Schaefer, she talked to the detective and 
the detective got a written statement from her. And I got 
their attention that they are going to try to use this to try 
to convict me on these charges. 
THE COURT: You've got to slow down for me for a 
second. And let's back up for just a second. And you 
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1 understand that you are entitled to be represented by a lawyer, 
2 right? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: And you want to be represented by a 
5 lawyer? 
6 I THE DEFENDANT: That's going to help me, yes. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. You understand that if you can't 
8 afford a lawyer, I will appoint one to represent you, right? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: And that's what's happened here? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Do you also understand, however, that in 
13 this case in that circumstance you are not entitled to a lawyer 
14 of your choosing? 
15 i THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. 
16 THE COURT: So there needs to be good cause for why I 
17 would interject myself in this relationship. Okay? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
19 THE COURT: And that's what I want you -- I think 
20 I what you .are trying to do is help me understand why you think 
21 there's good cause for me to interject myself and have new 
22 counsel appointed. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 THE DEFENDANT: So, therefore, I've got their 
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attention. I want to file a motion to suppress evidence based 
on the Detective (inaudible) had hard evidence that I had 
threatened my father and that was the purpose of why I went 
down to my father's house to talk to my father. 
THE COURT: File a motion to suppress what evidence? 
THE DEFENDANT: The evidence that the detective is 
saying that he has that I threatened my father the night of 
this, the incident happened. 
THE COURT: And what would your basis for this motion 
to suppress be? 
THE DEFENDANT: Why do they have a statement from 
somebody that wasn't there at the time of the incident that 
happened, you know? That's what I'm looking at because as far 
as I can see they are going to try to use that statement, you 
know, to make me look like I'm guilty. 
THE COURT: I'm listening. 
THE DEFENDANT: And they are arguing we have, you 
know, just like when we have trial for the motion to bring that 
all out, the paperwork from the Work Force Services I ain't 
never heard nothing about that. I heard no results of that. 
What's happened with that. I ain't heard nothing, almost 
nothing --
THE COURT: So can I categorize your complaints as 
really twofold? One that you believe that there is a motion to 
suppress to be filed out there, that they have refused to file 
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1 and that is the ineffectiveness claim? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
3 I THE COURT: And two that you are having inadequate 
4 communications? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Are there other --in specific you 
7 are thinking about not the Work Force Services but what the --
8 was it from the Division of Family and Child Services? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: The incident where Mrs. Martinez --
10 tried to commences 
11 THE COURT: We're talking about the DCFS records, 
12 right, not the Work Force -- anything to do with Work Force 
13 Services, right? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: The issues with DCFS. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: No other issues. 
17 J THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, you have evaluated 
18 this request for a motion? 
19 ' MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: And? 
21 MR. TAN: And your Honor, if I may respond to that. 
22 Not only that I evaluated it, I actually met with Ms. Shreve. 
23 We discussed it together. And basically putting both of our 
24 legal trial experiences as legal defenders, as trial attorneys, 
25 we looked at the issues. And we simply could not see any legal 
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basis to file this motion. And Ms. Shreve indicated to me her 
concern is as officers of the Court we should not be filing for 
these motions. And having looked at the issue, looked at.--
THE COURT: Is there any indication of a. 
constitutional infirmity here? 
MR. TAN: Not that we can see, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Because I don!t hear one from the 
description. I mean you are not saying it was an inappropriate 
search or anything like that? You are saying they got a 
statement from somebody you don't believe is there? 
THE. DEFENDANT: It was illegal. It was an illegal 
statement they received. 
THE COURT: How is it an illegal statement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Because the person wasn't there when 
the incident happened (inaudible.) 
MR. TAN: And as I indicated, your Honor, when 
Ms. Shreve and I met to go over legal issues, this is one that 
we discussed. As I indicated based on my experience as a 
criminal defense attorney and Ms. Shreve's experience as a 
criminal defense attorney, both concluded that for the time 
being there were no legal grounds that this motion to suppress 
as Mr. Martinez requested would be warranted. Ms. Shreve 
expressed her concern and I have the same concerns that we as 
officers of the court, we file a frivolous motion, we would be 
subject to sanctions. So that's one of the reasons why we 
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1 didn't file this motion. 
2 The other reason that we did not act upon filing this 
3 motion, if there were grounds to begin with, as my 
4 understanding, and I talked to Ms. Johnson about this, that the 
5 statement in question of which I believe is Mr. Martinez's 
6 father, my understanding is the State is not planning on having 
7 this witness in their case in chief. He has been subpoenaed 
8 and he is I guess a standby witness on rebuttal so that if 
9 Mr. Martinez gets on the stand, testifies and somehow opens the 
10 door, then maybe these statements will come in. 
11 But, you know, without actually doing the trial and 
12 knowing what will be said, that was the other issue is, 
13 frankly, if there is an issue, if it's not ripe to file 
14 anything at this point. 
15 Those are the two reasons that Ms. Shreve and I did 
16 not follow that request that Mr. Martinez -- ' 
17 THE COURT: So there might be an evidentiary reason 
18 to exclude the statements but not a constitutional. But 
19 there's not -- there's not a constitutional problem in your 
20 view that justifies a motion to suppress? 
21 MR. TAN: That's correct, your Honor. 
22 j THE COURT: All right. It may or may not be an 
23 evidentiary problem depending on how things unfold? 
24 MR. TAN: Yes. But my understanding having had a 
25 chance to talk to Ms. Johnson earlier around 2:00 o'clock today 
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is that Mr. Martinez!s father has been subpoenaed but that the 
State was not intending to putting this witness on the stand 
unless the door gets opened based on Mr. Martinez's testimony 
or and somehow they need to have him testify. 
THE COURT: What about the allegations that you have 
been dilatory in communicating with Mr. Martinez? 
MR. TAN: I can address that as well, your Honor. 
Your Honor, this is a steno pad I take with me to the jail and 
I usually make my visits out to the jail once a week. I have a 
list on my door that I basically have my secretary put down 
names of clients that want a visit. And I take this because 
the jail sometimes doesn't allow me to carry all the same for 
safety purposes. 
And I have documented the times that I have visited 
with Mr. Martinez. And I can say that Mr. Martinez is a 
regular client that I visit on a frequent basis. I -- just as 
a rough estimate I would say that either Ms. Shreve or myself 
or sometimes both of us would visit Mr. Martinez at the Salt 
Lake County Jail at least three out of the four weeks each 
month, and sometimes more than that when there are pressing 
issues and when there are discovery issues or anything that we 
want to update on. 
If I can't be there, Ms. Shreve is there. If she 
can't be there, I'm there. Sometimes we are both there. We 
keep a very careful record. We keep track of all of these 
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1 visits. And I can honestly represent to the Court that because 
2 of the severity of the case that both Ms. Shreve and I have 
3 visited Mr. Martinez more than most of my other clients. And 
4 so I have a record of that. I believe Ms. Shreve has a record 
5 of that as well. 
6 THE COURT: All right. How much time would you say 
7 on average you spend during these visits? 
8 I MR. TAN: I would say sometimes we have maybe just 15 
9 minute conversations if there's no updates. Sometimes we have 
10 conversations over an hour depending on what it is that we have 
11 to report back to Mr. Martinez on. 
12 We do make it a rigor pattern of just going and 
13 talking to him even if it's just simply to say we're still 
14 looking into getting this piece of evidence for you but our 
15 investigator has not received it yet. That's maybe the gist of 
16 that conversation and that visit. But sometimes Ms. Shreve and 
17 I would go and sit down with Mr. Martinez and we would talk 
18 about issues, defenses and specifically this self-defense. 
19 THE COURT: In particular have you spoken about the 
20 DCFS issues? 
21 MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor, we have.. 
22 j THE COURT: Again, without revealing any privilege, 
23 can you disclose the extent of those conversations? 
24 MR. TAN: And, your Honor, I will only speak for 
25 myself. I want also to allow Ms. Shreve to also address that 
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as well because she has been the one that has done more 
research and actually filed the motion in trying to get those 
DCFS records. 
THE COURT: Let me put it this way. Have you 
communicated to him the results of your efforts? 
MR. TAN: Yes, I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Shreve? 
MS. SHREVE: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. They tell me they have told 
you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, I didn't hear no results 
of the DCFS issue until when Mr. Tan came and saw me Wednesday. 
And he didn't tell me it, I had to ask him why haven't you guys 
told me this? They came out and saw me. I'm not going to deny 
that. They came out and saw me at the jail several times based 
on me calling them now that I needed to talk to them. That's 
when they would come out. 
THE COURT: I'm struggling to see what the real 
problem is here, Mr. Martinez, to be blunt with you. Let's --
the issue-- regarding the father back me up one more time. 
They have a statement from your father? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, they don't have a statement from 
my father. The Detective O'Connell he stated to me (inaudible) 
that he has hard evidence about my father 
THE COURT: That you have threatened your father? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that I threatened my father the 
2 night of the incident when the incident happened. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: So, therefore, the next day he and 
5 another officer had went to my father's house to state to my 
6 father for whatever reason I have no idea. So therefore --
7 THE COURT: Does it matter why the detectives would 
8 J have chosen --
9 THE DEFENDANT: It doesn't matter but, yeah, it does 
10 matter in a sense, yeah, because now they are going to try to 
11 use that, that written statement mainly look for like I'm 
12 guilty --
13 THE COURT: They have the written statement that they 
14 obtained from? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: From his wife. 
16 THE COURT: From his wife. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Have you seen this written 
19 statement? 
20 MS. SHREVE: Yes. 
21 MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. And I believe --
22 j THE COURT: was the written statement provided in 
23 discovery? 
24 MR. TAN: It was, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: May I see it? 
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MS. SHREVE: Ms. Schaefer. 
MR. TAN: This is the new Schaefer. 
THE COURT: And this is Mr. Martinez!s father's wife? 
MS. SHREVE: Yes. 
MR. TAN: I believe it would be his stepmom. 
THE COURT: Stepmom. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, that's not the only 
statement I brought to their attention as well. The other 
statement that's in there is from a Candy Seminole(phonetic) 
that works for DCFS, works for Work Services, which 
Ms. Martinez's sister-in-law, she's married to her brother. 
And she's got a statement, a written statement that she has 
witnessed several altercations between me and Mrs. Martinez. 
THE COURT: Let me try --a motion to suppress is a 
motion that says somehow the evidence was illegally or 
unconstitutionally obtained. 
THE DEFENDANT: There's no way. 
THE COURT: And they are saying we've evaluated it in 
those terms and we don't have a good faith basis for bringing 
it. There may be evidentiary reasons, in other words, it may 
not come into evidence. And what I hear them saying it may not 
be an issue at all, right? And if it is, depending on what's 
said, we'll evaluate it then. So do you see what I mean? 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand what you are saying. 
THE COURT: I don't see anything that is deficient at 
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all in terms of that evaluation, frankly, at all. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well --
THE COURT: I've heard just -- what I've seen so far 
if they try to bring this as a motion to suppress versus 
perhaps, you know, seeking some evidentiary ruling, and Ms. 
Shreve is right, what they would get is an ear full based on 
just what you told me. Maybe there's something else, I don't 
know. 
I don't -- what else do you -- they've told you about 
the DCFS investigations? 
THE DEFENDANT: Barely on Wednesday because I 
questioned about it. 
THE COURT: They've come out and talked to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, when he came out --he came out 
Wednesday to talk to me about me sending a letter to you and to 
him and then to the district attorney to ask for new counsel. 
And he goes what is it I have to do to get copies (inaudible) 
make, you know, what's not going right. How do you feel things 
not going right -- you know, figure something out, you know. 
And I just told him I just don't feel you guys are, you know --
that wasn't -- the DCFS issue was a lot. I haven't heard 
nothing about. Until today you haven't even told me nothing 
about the DCFS issues, you guys filing a motion. I don't even 
know what's going on with that, you know. And then I filed --
. THE COURT: I still haven't seen those records. Just 
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for the record, I mean, you are complaining about I still 
haven't seen the records. 
';•• THE DEFENDANT: That's what he told me (inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Yeah, so it's -- there is a lot of delay 
here. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Well, you now understand 
there's a lot of delay here while I was waiting for trial. 
That was my main concern is bringing this -- bringing all this 
stuff up that, you know, this ain't showing -- this ain't got 
this, this ain't got that, but yet they aren't telling me what 
we don't got and what we do got. And how are we supposed to be 
ready for trial in August in such the report. That was what my 
main concern is I felt I wasn't getting their best --by 
defending me. So that's why I did what I did, write in these 
letters to you guys. 
THE COURT: Mr. Martinez, based on what you've told 
me so far, I see absolutely no basis for replacing counsel in 
this case. 
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Things might change. You are 
always invited to bring matters to my attention, but if you 
have something else to say or other complaints you haven't told 
me about, I'm interested in hearing that. But what you've told 
me so far does not in my opinion form the basis for having me 
interject myself into this relationship. Okay? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, Mr. Ferbrache --
3 MR. FERBRACHE: Your Honor --
4 THE COURT: -- do you see it differently? 
5 MR. FERBRACHE: Absolutely not. As far as the issue 
6 that was brought up with the DCFS records, the AG's office 
7 contacted me wanting to know if it was okay to make a copy for 
8 the court of that letter in response to the court's order. I 
9 indicated absolutely. So I'm expecting it, all the parties 
10 involved will receive, receive that contact from the AG's 
11 office. 
12 THE COURT: I'd like you to pre-docket it, 
13 Ms. Shreve, and let's make sure that I have it by, can we say 
14 next week? 
15 MS. SHREVE: Here's the issue I've had since the 
16 subpoena has been sent, about three conversations with the AG's 
17 office calling, needing additional information about Julio and 
18 his birthday, then calling back and arranging, then a 
19 conversation with Carol Devoia --
20 THE COURT: Verdoai. 
21 MS. SHREVE: -- Verdoia discussing the DCFS records 
22 j and then having her looking into, her, her clerk cominn~ back. 
23 So there's been multiple communications. 
24 THE COURT: Can we set this for June 25th at 
25 9:00 o'clock in the morning just as a status on where we are 
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and ask that you --if there's anything you want me to do, if 
you all want to get me on the phone with the DCFS as well, 
whatever would be helpful in moving this along. 
So Ms. Johnson, do you see it differently? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor, if we received the 
answer by June 25th can we just strike that scheduling 
conference? 
THE COURT: We can. I was not referring to that. I 
was referring to the inquiry into this particular issue. 
MS. JOHNSON: I think we're -- I would agree with the 
court's assessment. I believe that Mr. Martinez has the 
benefit to excellent attorneys who have been working diligently 
on his case. 
THE COURT: Do you have concerns? Do either of you 
have concerns here? 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, the, the only follow up that I 
wanted to just address the Court about so Mr. Martinez -- I 
understand that the court's ruling is that there are no 
ineffective issues thus far. I want to see, though, if there 
are any type of conflict issues. I, as the court is making its 
assessment, I can see that Mr. Martinez is, is not happy and 
satisfied with what the court is assessing and saying so far. 
I just want to make sure if there are any other conflicts that 
might not relate to motions to suppress or DCFS information, 
but if there are any other conflicts if, in fact, he feels we 
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1 were not visiting him enough, we have not represented him 
2 enough, I would like to since we are here address those as 
3 well. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I've tried to do that. I've tried 
5 to say two things to just make it clear. One, I'm not cutting 
6 you off from future complaints. If, in fact, you have 
7 additional complaints, even if I do not agree with you here, 
8 J you always should, you should voice them. Right? 
9 And two was an inquiry as to whether there was 
10 anything else going on that you had complaints about. I'm not 
11 limiting this to just ineffective assistance argument. I see 
12 it as a broader issue in terms of whether there's any good 
13 cause for interjecting myself in the relationship. That's only 
14 one. 
15 J But a complete breakdown in communications or another 
16 conflict between them. There are a variety of reasons which 
17 might in addition to ineffective assistance constitute a basis 
18 for the Court to replace counsel. 
19 I find.-- I want to make the record clear I find no 
20 basis so far on.any grounds and it's not just limited to this 
21 notion of ineffective assistance. 
22 s Mr. Martinez, is there anything else that you have to 
23 complain of? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
25 THE COURT: Do you want to think about this, think 
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about it a little bit longer and then come back and if you have 
other issues that you want to talk to me about? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: Let's have this file lodged -- okay. 
Thank you. 
MR. TAN: And your Honor, if we can be excused that's 
all we have. / 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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Q. And do you glance at it while you're helping 
customers? 
A. Sometimes I do. 
Q. Okay. Were you glancing at it on this occasion? 
A. Irm pretty sure I did. 
Q. And I think you already answered this but I'm going 
to ask it again. If you would give gas away for free, you 
would lose your job, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If another customer saw you give gas away for free 
you would lose your job, correct? 
A. Yes. 
MS. SHREVE: One moment, your Honor. May I have a 
moment? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (BY MS. SHREVE) You just testified that you had small 
talk but this is the first time you had small talk with him? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Sir, do you remember testifying in a preliminary 
hearing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember being sworn in at that 
preliminary hearing to tell the truth? 
A. Yeah. 
MS. SHREVE: Your Honor, may I approach? 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
Q. (BY MS. SHREVE) I'm going to have you look at 
something and just read it to yourself. 
THE COURT: Direct opposing counsel to the page and 
line. 
MS. SHREVE: Page 50 the bottom half of that page, 
page 49 the bottom half and page 52. 
Q. (BY MS. SHREVE) Have you had an opportunity? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you recall at the preliminary hearing testifying 
that you had dozens of conversations before? 
A. Brought it out, it says that. \ 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I 
don't think that's a fair characterization of what she just 
read. 
THE COURT: Read it. On a question and answer basis, 
read it. 
Stick it up there in front of him, you ask the 
questions, he can provide the answer. 
Where do you want to start, Ms. Johnson, for context 
where do you want it to end? 
MS, SHREVE:. Just a moment, your Honor, 
I'm going to withdraw and let me ask --
THE COURT: Nope. Read it. Start '-- tell me where 
you want it to start from. 
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MS. SHREVE: Page 50 line --
MS. JOHNSON: Fourteen through 17. 
THE COURT: What's the question? 
MS. JOHNSON: Question by defense attorney: "Okay, 
can you give me a rough estimation? Dozens?" 
"Answer: I, I can't really tell you that, but he's 
been there. I've seen him sometimes. You know, sometimes I 
don't even ring him up, but you know I see people around." 
THE COURT: All right. You are admonished that that 
is an incorrect impeachment. 
MS. SHREVE: Okay. 
Q. (BY MS. SHREVE) But he's been in the store numerous 
times before, correct? 
A. Yes. 
MS. SHREVE: No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Is this witness 
excused? 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any reason not to excuse this witness? 
All ri^ht. Members of the jury we're going to break 
I'll see you here at 9:00 o'clock sharp tomorrow morning. A 
few minutes before would be better, all right? We'll get 
started right away. 
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1 Counsel, I'd like you here at 8:30. All right. All 
2 rise for the jury. 
3 There's a gentleman with a recording device that 
4 needs to remain behind as well. 
5 (Jury exits the courtroom.) 
6 THE COURT: You know better than that, Ms. Shreve. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: What is it -- I don't understand. 
8 I What do you mean when she said --
9 THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't talking to you. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but this is regarding --
11 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You sit down. I wasn't 
12 speaking to you. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand how — • 
14 THE COURT: Ms. Shreve, you know better than that, 
15 right? 
16 MS. SHREVE: Right. 
17 THE COURT: All right. What was happening was, was 
18 the, the words that he said, that he swarred her testimony is 
19 not what Ms. Shreve said. What Ms. Shreve said is that he 
20 testified he had dozens of conversations with you under oath. 
21 That is not what that said. 
22 j THE DEFENDANT: It says it right here on the 
23 preliminary transcripts. 
24 THE COURT: Really? Want to read it again? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Do you want me to read it to 
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you? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
THE DEFENDANT: It says right here. It says, "Okay. 
I don't even -- I don't even count, man. Okay. Can I give 
you, give you a rough estimate? That is, I can't really tell 
you that, but he doesn't -- there I see him sometimes, you 
know, sometimes I don't even ring him up. But you know I see 
people around. 
THE COURT: Not even close. 
THE DEFENDANT: So who is saying that then? 
THE COURT: All right. We are done with this 
discussion. You can talk to your lawyers. That is an improper 
impeachment. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I think I'm going to file an 
ineffective counsel on me then because you're not 
representing -- you are not going right through the --
THE COURT: Well, you -- you know, you file whatever 
you think is appropriate with me. That's okay. I don't mind 
that. That is an incorrect impeachment. I've admonished your 
lawyer as a result of that. 
I do not read that. You tell me if I am wrong, 
Ms. Shreve. Does that say he had dozens of conversations 
the individual? 
MS. SHREVE: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Tan? 
.TOSP. JIMENEZ - Cross by MS. SHREVE 115 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
transcript. 
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MR. 
been admitted 
TAN: No, your Honor. 
COURT: All right. 
DEFENDANT: Well, it's right there in the 
COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
FERBRACHE: Your Honor, as to the evidence that's 
, where would you like us to put that? One of 
them being a set of scissors. Don't want to necessarily leave | 
that out. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MR. 
]
 a clean copy. 
THE 
And 
conversations 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: Give me a copy. Let me have a copy. 
SHREVE: I can --
COURT: Let me have a copy. 
FERBRACHE: I have a full copy, your Honor. It's 
May I approach? 
COURT: Yep. Page 50? 
I think your question was: You had dozens of 
with him, right? 
SHREVE: Yes, that was my question. 
COURT: Okay. 
Okay. See you here at 8:30 tomorrow. 
MS. 
1 (—* H. 
JLJ.XJU 
SHREVE: Okay. 
4
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courtroom. And you may not remember, but this all stemmed from 
the Warren Jeff fs trial where somebody came in and they were 
able to get a picture of, you know, of an exhibit or what have 
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chambers. 
(In chambers.) 
THE COURT: We're without the Defendant in the matter 
of State vs. Julio Martinez. 
• * Mr. Tan has suggested that there's a motion that the 
Defense would like to raise in private. 
Mr. Tan. 
MS. SHREVE: Well, let me do this first. We -- our 
issue is yesterday we went to Judge Hilder. We did an ex-parte 
because it held sensitive information as in the instructions we 
got from our office. I had --we relayed some information to 
Judge Hilder and I then said I had concerns if he told that 
information to the trial judge that it would be a problem, and 
we addressed how to deal with that and perhaps with the trial 
judge. 
So I don't know exactly what Judge Hilder said, but I 
would like to know in lieu of the motion. And I would like to 
handle it kind of like an ineffective assistance of counsel 
hearing where I don't -- I don't necessarily want to stay a 
party to it, depending on what the information is. If it's no 
information, then it's no problem. 
THE COURT: Well, sure. I'm happy to do that however 
you want. I raised it immediately because as soon as he 
started talking to me and telling *me anything that was said to 
you, I've treated it as an ex-parte communication albeit an 
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1 indirect ex-parte cornmunication. And that's why I instructed 
2 the State be put on the phone immediately. 
3 I think the best thing to do would be to have Judge 
4 Hilder perhaps participate and relate what was said and what 
5 have you -- does that make sense? But I don't --
6 MS. JOHNSON: Well, your Honor, I think just guessing 
7 here, that they would be asking for a recusal based on what 
8 Judge Hilder said to your Honor. So I don't know that what 
9 Judge Hilder knew is important. What was important is what was 
10 relayed to your Honor.--
11 MS. SHREVE: Correct. 
12 MS. JOHNSON: --by Judge Hilder. So I don't know 
13 that it necessarily even involved Judge Hilder. 
14 MS. SHREVE: Correct. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, you can file a written 
16 motion for recusal or ask for recusal, and we can send it to 
17 the judge and take a few minutes or whatever. I mean, if you 
18 are asking for recusal, we stop the process at this time, 
19 suspend the proceedings while --
20 MS. SHREVE: I don't think it would be necessary to 
21 get there. 
22 THE COURT: Well, it works one of two ways. If you 
23 ask for recusal, the process immediately stops. At that point 
24 in time the motion is given to me for decision about whether I 
25 say yea or nay. If I say nay, then automatically under statute 
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it goes to the associating presiding judge based on your papers 
or your argument for recusal. 
And if he believes that there's a basis for recusal, 
then he'll recuse me, I I don't. If he doesn't believe that 
there's a basis for recusal, then he won't. 
And I don't know what your concern is. You can ---. 
you know, I (inaudible.) 
If that's fine and the other thing is we can bring in 
Judge Hilder, and Judge Hilder can say on the record exactly 
what it is that he told me. Because really it doesn't matter 
what -- I think exactly as Ms. Johnson suggested, it doesn't 
matter what Judge Hilder was told. 
MS. SHREVE: It matters to us. 
THE COURT: What Judge Hilder would have told me? 
MS. SHREVE: I think that' s probably how it should be 
handled. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Your Honor, as we were discussing 
this, I think in the case I believe (inaudible) so I understand 
that there may not be a decision but Gabe (inaudible). They 
indicated (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Sure. I think Judge Hilder right now is 
in Summit County. We can do it telephonically. And I know 
he's coming back down, but why don't I -- give me two minutes 
to speak with general counsel for the courts since this is an 
odd proceeding. Give you a couple of minutes to talk about the 
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process with --
MR. FERBRACHE: With Heidi. 
THE COURT: With Heidi or whoever it is. And then 
we'll reconvene in 10 minutes or so. 
(Recess taken by the court.) 
THE COURT: For the record, I'm so sorry, the record 
was off. I'm just going to briefly summarize. 
We had a conversation off-the-record in which I 
recounted the history of this matter and asked you to recount 
our conversations. Would you repeat them please. 
JUDGE HILDER: I'll do my best. I'm getting better 
at it. As I indicated Ms. Shreve and Mr. Tan came in a little 
after five at the direction, as I understand, Mr. Anderson or 
maybe it was Ms. Buchi to discuss an issue of concern arising 
from an ongoing trial at which time she indicated to me that 
counsel were having some challenges with their client, the 
defendant. And as Judge Himonas clarified earlier, Mr. Tan 
indicated that there was a sense of intimidation and staring 
down episode and we did not discuss what was behind that, just 
had to do with counsel be given a response there was the stare 
down. 
THE COURT: What I remember was you had said, for 
exanple, you know, it's stare down, Mr. Tan, insubstantive and 
Ms. Shreve was intimidated. 
JUDGE HILDER: And Ms. Shreve had indicated a sense 
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that, and I use it (inaudible) I think these words from you 
which came from counsel that they couldn't really articulate 
what it was, but that there was a sense of being compromised in 
the ability to exercise a judgment they normally exercise or to 
make a decision they would normally make. Specifically, Ms. 
Shreve's comment that having done something later that day, 
yesterday, that was against an old judge that she normally 
would not have done. 
THE COURT: You indicated there was some sense that 
it may have been gender based as well. 
.. JUDGE HILDER: Oh, yeah. I didn't say -- I told you 
that, yes, and I felt like we may have had a Defendant, yeah, I 
said to you, and I said this in a more hypothetical sense, and 
that's the way I think I said it to you, that it was really in 
the area of the discussion I think, Judge Himonas, of options 
and whether we should or should not address such issues and 
that was there could be some defendants with gender for other 
reasons which may be an issue that would, in fact, be better 
served by a different counsel appointment. That that was one 
factor that might have been worked here. I think that's pretty 
-- I can't remember anything else. But -- and that's a quick 
summary. Did I give anything else at lunch time? 
THE COURT: There was one other thing that I 
mentioned this morning that I didn't mention now, and that is 
we had a brief discussion, and I didn't get the sense that the 
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1 intimidation was in not putting on something that may be valid 
2 and helpful, but that was causing them to do things that they 
3 may not otherwise do. And I believe I asked you that this 
4 morning, and you termed that. Am I misrecollecting that? 
5 MS. SHREVE: No, that's I -- I, after sleeping on it, 
6 waking up this morning with some additional security that I 
7 felt like I am comfortable to go forward and advocate for my 
8 client and not allow this affect my ability to represent him. 
9 THE COURT: The reason we have Judge Hilder here, 
10 though, is you were concerned that he may have relayed some 
11 information to him that had been relayed to me — 
12 MS. SHREVE: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: -- may cause a basis for recusal. And 
14 what I would suggest is that you just step out for 20 seconds 
15 J with Judge Hilder, remind him of what that was. 
16 JUDGE HILDER: Probably there are other things you 
17 told me (inaudible.) 
18 • .MS. SHREVE: Yeah, I think given the conversation 
19 between --
20 JUDGE HILDER: You told me -- you did tell me things 
21 that would have been a concern of. I think the only other term 
22 j I might have used was that the concern might be an effective 
23 strategy, and that is different --
24 THE COURT: I leave it up to you. If you feel like 
25 you want to step outside for a few minutes --
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1 JUDGE HILDER: Well, I have talked to you, but I know 
2 (inaudible) . 
3 MS. SHREVE: Yeah, I think given what has been 
4 relayed here, I don't think we have a good basis for a motion 
5 to recuse --
6 THE COURT: And the red line is on so unless it's off 
7 in the courtroom, Judge Hilder --
8 I JUDGE HILDER: The red light was on last time. 
9 THE COURT: They told me they didn't record it. 
10 JUDGE HILDER: It didn't record it? I think it 
11 wasn't on there. I think they realized it wasn't on the record 
12 here. 
13 MS. SHREVE: I thought 
14 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Let's make sure. 
15 JUDGE HILDER: The light was on. Definitely. 
16 THE COURT: Well, thank you. And I'll -- that's a 
17 cut in pay. 
18 (Out in the courtroom.) 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Ferbrache -- let's go on the 
20 record -- you've had a chance to consult with advocates for the 
21 victim about the conversations we've had in chambers? 
22 l MR. FERBRACHE: I have. 
23 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes. Yes, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: And based upon the disclosures that have 
25 been made, I understand that there is no motion to recuse? 
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MR. TAN: That's right, your Honor. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go back on the record in the 
matter of the State vs. -- I keep looking at the wrong file and 
I'm so sorry -- in the matter of Julio Inez Martinez. Is it 
Enez or Inez? Or Enez? 
THE DEFENDANT: It's Inez. 
THE COURT: Inez Martinez. Okay. 
Ms. Johnson, will you be conducting the examination? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, Mr. Ferbrache will. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferbrache, do you have to run to the 
bathroom again? 
MR. FERBRACHE: I don't want to admit. 
THE COURT: I am so happy you told me that because as 
you all know there are two types of people in this world those 
that know when something can cause you to stop and those that 
won't. Guess which one I am? 
All rise for the jury, please. 
Well, was three hours long enough for you for lunch? 
You may be seated. I'm very sorry for the delays. 
They were all necessary and I hope you will just trust me about 
that. 
Call your next witness. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Hello, sir. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
ic -k -k 
THE COURT: This is State of Utah vs. Julio Martinez. 
It's Case No. 091903723. Will you enter your appearances, 
please. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandi Johnson and Gregory Ferbrache for 
the State. 
MR. TAN: Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve for Julio 
Martinez. 
THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, Mr. Ferbrache, are you aware 
of last night's developments? 
MR. TAN: No. 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: At approximately 6:00 p.m. I was 
telephoned by the presiding judge, Judge Hilder, informing me 
that Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve had engaged -- I don't think you 
had spoke directly with Judge Hilder, had you? 
MR. TAN: We did, your Honor. 
THE COURT: -- that they had engaged in -- I'm not 
sure they are inappropriate but ex-parte communications with 
Judge Hilder regarding this matter and that Mr. Tan's office 
had as well engaged in these communications. And Mr. Tan, you 
correct me if at any time I'm wrong. 
I think the gist of the communications was that they 
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1 were communicated to me by Judge Hilder is that Mr. Tan and 
2 Ms. Shreve feel extremely threatened by their client to the 
3 point that they are worried about their ability to put on a 
4 defense and feel that they have compromised perhaps by making 
5 some bad judgment calls, perhaps last night was an example of 
6 one, because of the threats -- I'm saying threats, but that may 
7 not be right, but because of the perceived intimidation from 
8 J their client, and were in a quandary about what to do with it. 
9 And as a result of communicating with the head of their office 
10 and with Judge Hilder as well, who telephoned me and with whom 
11 I discussed the matter. I directed Judge Hilder to immediately 
12 try to set up a telephone conference so I could relate this 
13 information to you and to Mr. Frerbrache as quickly as 
14 possible. And I know that Ms. Shreve worked to do that. She 
15 called me during the evening telling me that she was unable to 
16 successfully complete that. Is that accurate? 
17 MR. TAN: It is, your Honor. And I'm --
18 THE COURT: Am I missing anything? 
19 MR. TAN: No, your Honor. I think that's pretty much 
20 a good summary. We did indicate to Judge Hilder that part of 
21 what we do, we come across situations like these a lot from our 
22 clients, but there's just something about this particular 
23 individual that raises concerns to us. 
24 THE COURT: So I thought the first and most 
25 appropriate thing to do, Mr. Ferbrache and Ms. Johnson, was to 
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make sure that everybody is obviously playing from a level 
playing field and bring those communications to your attention. 
MS. JOHNSON: I appreciate that. 
THE COURT: The second is to decide where you go from 
here. I donft know if you've had any requests whatsoever that 
was after having slept on it, perhaps frustration at the 
admonishment that Ms. Shreve received at the end of the day. 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, I don't think that is an issue 
for Ms. Shreve nor myself. I think the bigger concern is just 
our ability to continue to adequately and zealously represent 
Mr. Martinez in trial. 
THE COURT: It's your duty adequately and zealously 
to represent him. And it sounds to me, you correct me if I am 
wrong, it's not that you are foregoing legitimate 
cross-examination, you are not foregoing the -- and I don't 
want you to answer this in any way that would invade the 
integrity of the attorney/client privilege or work product, 
that it's not that you are foregoing good stuff, it's that 
perhaps his intimidation has led you to do things that would 
otherwise be against your professional judgment. 
MR. TAN: That's accurate, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TAN: And your Honor, the other concern I have, 
and I just checked, I haven't had any messages from Ms. Shreve, 
I know when she and I talked last night, the plan was for her 
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1 and I to meet this morning at 8:15.in front of the courtroom so 
2 we could further go over the details and have a better game 
3 plan to propose to both the Court and the State. The fact that 
4 she's not here yet also concerns me as well. 
5 THE COURT: I also have some concerns as well. 
6 Ms. Johnson is a not nidified to this precise 
7 situation. This is very similar to a similar murder case we 
8 J handled about a year and a half ago where there was a Defendant 
9 who was, to put it mildly, extraordinarily unhappy with the 
10 defense that his counsel put on, and following the conclusion 
11 of the trial, correct me if I am wrong, Ms. Johnson, brought a 
12 motion for a new trial based on a variety of allegations 
13 including ineffective assistance of counsel. And we were able 
14 then with the hindsight of trial, I mean not in the heat of the 
15 battle, to evaluate under what appropriate standards, strict or 
16 whatever appropriate standard applies and make an appropriate 
17 decision. 
18 And it seems to me, why should this be any different? 
19 Does the State see it differently? Understanding this is all 
20 i very new to the State and you haven't had a really --
21 Mr. Ferbrache and Ms. Johnson a chance to digest this, perhaps 
22 I it's unfair to ask you that question right now and just give 
23 you a chance to noodle it. 
24 MS. JOHNSON: And your Honor, I would appreciate some 
25 time to just discuss that. Without invading the client/lawyer 
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relationship, if there have been actual threats of harm 
directed toward Ms. Shreve or Mr. Tan, and frankly as a 
prosecutor I would have a duty to investigate that because 
that's a crime. 
THE COURT: That's a whole different issue. 
MS. JOHNSON: And so I think that's one of those 
where if this --if there's legitimate threats of harm being 
directed toward them, then that's a different matter than they 
feel intimidated by their client. So I think I would just like 
to discuss that with Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve, if they can 
provide at least a little more specifics without invading that 
relationship. 
THE COURT: My sense right now, and I'm not going to 
get in the way of your work, Ms. Johnson, because you know 
extremely well what you are doing, is that it's more of the 
latter of the intimidation, but that's not the point. And if 
that's the case, Mr. Tan, my initial reaction is, forgive me 
saying this a little bit, but it's -- you've got a duty to your 
client and you're also an officer of the Court. And at some 
point you just call, excuse my french, bullshit, and you don't 
do things like last night. Right? 
MR. TAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: The impeachment. 
MR. TAN: Yes. And --
THE COURT: And I wanted to talk to Ms. Shreve about 
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that. I'll repeat this to her. There's a right way and a 
wrong way to do that. The right way would have been to hand --
to have two copies, to hand a copy to the witness, to read the 
question and read the answer. And then I figure out whether 
that's proper impeachment or not. 
The second is, once she discerned that it was not 
really impeachable is to not simply withdraw it, but to admit 
the error. Because this witness is entitled to some integrity. 
And otherwise to leave the witness with the notion that he has 
somehow perjured himself in front of the jury is really an 
unfairness to the witness. And --
MR. TAN: And --
THE COURT: So either of those would have been 
satisfactory. 
MR. TAN: And I totally understand that, your Honor. 
And I can speak on Ms. Shreve's behalf that that was not at all 
her intention to do that. As an officer of the Court, I think 
to put it mildly she was rather rattled. 
THE COURT: Water under the bridge. Ms. Shreve has 
appeared in front of me thousands of times. This in no way, 
shape, or form affects my opinion of Ms. Shreve. This is stuff 
that we do. When I took the bench I promised I would never 
forget what it was like to practice a lawyer. I remember 
things like this happen, no big deal, but I thought I'd use 
this as a learning experience so that Ms. Shreve would 
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understand the proper way to do the impeachment, or when 
something improper happens to admit it. Because the problem is 
without admitting there was an error, the jury was still left 
with the potential impression that this witness had prejudiced 
himself on her own. And that was simply unfair. That would be 
unfair to the witness. 
There's Ms. Shreve. Why don't you take -- both take 
five minutes to speak to Ms. Shreve. 
MS. SHREVE: I apologize, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's okay, Ms. Shreve. No problem. 
Why don't you all take five minutes and we'll come 
back in. Okay. 
(Recess taken by the court.) 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go back on the record. 
You've had a chance to digest what I've said. 
Ms. Johnson, I'd like to start with you and wonder 
what your thoughts are. 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, in speaking with Ms. Shreve 
and Mr. Tan, it's my impression that at this point they are 
both going to be representing him with the integrity of court 
officers and do their job like they should. 
I have also talked with them about some safety 
measures that we could take to perhaps help alleviate any 
concerns they might have. I offered them different scenarios 
of what we could do to accomplish that, and I left it up to 
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1 them as to whether or not they -- what they thought of those 
2 ideas. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, Ms. Shreve, I'd like 
4 to hear from you about your thoughts. 
5 MR. TAN: Your Honor, if we may approach the bench 
6 first. 
7 THE COURT: You may. 
8 I (Discussion held at sidebar off the record.) 
9 THE COURT: I'll see counsel in chambers. Please 
10 leave the record on. 
11 (In chambers.) 
12 THE COURT: Sorry to start your morning with this. 
13 There's actually -- first thing (inaudible) I want to tell you 
14 there's a right way and a wrong way to do an impeachment. You 
15 must really be willing to take the document up to the 
16 individual, all right, give them the paper in front of them, 
17 you ask the question, and the answer, (inaudible). 
18 And the second is I just simply said that you have 
19 made an error, so that left the impression that you've actually 
20 been impeached. I would not have admonished you if it was the 
21 fact that that happened. Okay? 
22 j MS. SHREVE: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: So in the future either of those would 
24 not drop (inaudible) or the former is preferred, but you have 
25 nothing to worry about. 
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MS. SHREVE: Yeah --
THE COURT: I have a great deal of respect for you. 
MS. SHREVE: I would be disappointed if you didn't 
call me on it. So I'm absolutely -- yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Tan. 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, I'm somewhat -- I have three 
issues. On the one hand I have to continue to zealously 
represent our defendant. And because of that I can't disclose 
certain information. 
THE COURT: Nor, do I want you to. I will tell you, 
though, when we he comes out, we will have to put on the record 
that counsel have disclosed that they felt intimidated, felt 
intimidated by him. That may be or may not be a breach, but 
that has to happen. ' • • . , 
MR. TAN: Thank you. Also the second issue, the 
second issue, the second (inaudible) I have is (inaudible) 
certain deeds to and obligations to the court. But I think the 
third is really important issue I think personally, and I think 
Charity might take a different position, but my third issue at 
this point is (inaudible) it's the well -- the wellbeing of my 
client. 
THE COURT: He's worried about you. 
MS. SHREVE: We're worried. I'm okay. Let's go. The 
State is going to help me out. We'll be fine. 
(Back in open court.) 
13 
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THE BAILIFF: Remain seated. Court's again in 
session. 
THE COURT: All right. I just want to reiterate, 
though, that there are certain disclosures that will have to be 
placed on the record with the Defendant. 
Do you want to step out for a minute, Ms. Johnson? 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Bring out the Defendant, please. 
Good morning, sir. 
THE DEFENDANT: Good morning. 
THE COURT: Let's reflect on the record the Defendant 
is now present. 
Let's talk a little bit about yesterday so that you 
understand where I'm coming from. 
I went back and listened to that tape and then 
listened again. 
MS. SHREVE: Judge, we don't have the State here. 
THE COURT: It makes it easier that way. Let's wait 
for the State, please. You may be seated. 
All right, the State is here. 
Mr. Martinez, I never want you to think that I treat 
your concerns lightly. Sir, what I did is went back and 
listened to that tape and reviewed that transcript several 
times. And I have to say that in my opinion you're just wrong. 
That the question was: Isn't it true that you had dozens of 
I A 
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conversations with the individual? And what the question and 
answer was is, no, he had been in there dozens of times. So 
very different. All right? 
But I wanted you to know I didn't stop them. That 
was my recollection. That's why I did admonish them but just 
to make sure I'm wrong, because it wouldn't be the first time 
I'm wrong, I went back and listened to that tape several times. 
And if I was wrong, Mr. Martinez, I want you to understand that 
it's my philosophy that if you are going to eat crow, eat it 
while it's young. Okay? So but there wasn't in my opinion an 
error there. 
That having been said, I don't believe that your 
behavior was appropriate. And I hope you won't do that. I 
hope that you will agree with me that I've treated you with 
respect throughout these proceedings, from beginning to end. 
And that is always my -- that is always my goal. 
If you believe that I haven't, if you believe that 
I've done anything wrong, I encourage you, I encourage 
everybody to file every appropriate paperwork with it. I'm 
happy to have my conduct constantly surveyed. It just makes me 
do a better job. That's first. 
± n c D c u u i i a x o J_ • v c j j c a i J.IIJ»VJJLUIC:U. ±jy y u u i U U U I I D C I UIICLL. 
they feel intimidated by you, whether rightfully or wrongfully 
they feel intimidated in a way and have disclosed that 
intimidation and that has perhaps caused them to do things that 
15 
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1 they would not otherwise do as officers of the Court. I'm 
2 thinking of yesterday's inpeachment, for example, Ms. Shreve. 
3 I don't know if that's a fair example or not. But that is an 
4 appropriate disclosure to place on the record. 
5 We're going to go forward with this trial. Okay? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Well, I agree with what you said, 
7 your Honor. I was wrong about what she had asked you. What I 
8 J gave her was a piece of paper that (inaudible.) And she asked 
9 if there was any questions that I wanted to ask Jose. There's 
10 quite a few things in this. I went over it again last night. 
11 I went over again. And the things that are in yellow, there's 
12 things that are in green. And her being a lawyer help 
13 defend -- then right here it says APT. That says appointed 
14 .attorney --
15 I THE COURT: Yes. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: -- part of No. 2. So that there are 
17 different abbreviations on here that says Judge, and it says 
18 witness. No. 3, witness, you know, APT No. 2. So there's 
19 questions that have been asked through the witness, Jose 
20 Jimenez, and there are statements he had made regarding --
21 THE COURT: But you think that they are inconsistent. 
22 j I can't pass on those because that wasn't the question that was 
23 given to me. I can only pass on the one. And like I said, I 
24 called it the way I saw it. But because I take everybody's 
25 concerns seriously, not just yours, but everybody's, I pulled 
i a 
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that transcript two or three times. I listened to the tape and 
went back and forth to make sure. 
Now the other thing is if you believe at the end of 
the day that you haven't been effectively represented, that 
there's a problem, you have -- you know, people frequently 
bring before me or before the appellate courts, motions for the 
ineffective assistance of counsel. And this might be the kind 
of stuff that you do where you say, listen, these are the kinds 
of questions that I had asked, these are the kind of questions 
I wanted asked and what have you, and those get evaluated. 
Okay? 
I'm not taking your concerns lightly. I never have 
taken your concerns lightly. I understand how important this 
is to you. And that's why -- even for example, I'm careful to 
explain why if I joke with the jurors when we're picking them, 
it's just so that we get better answers from them and more 
honest from them. Okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I'm already going to fill out a 
motion to -- file for a new counsel based on integrity of 
counsel (inaudible.) 
THE COURT: I did after we talked about it for a 
while because I didn't .think that there was a basis for it at 
the time. 
THE DEFENDANT: There are issues now today. You 
know, I was told by Mr. Patrick that when we first started this 
17 
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case, looking into this case, he had represented me, he told 
me, I asked him, so how are we doing? Are we globalizing all 
these together or are we fighting them one at a time? He goes, 
Martinez, how do you want to do it? I said, well, how do you 
think we should do it? What -- what, you know --he goes we're 
going to fight it one at a time, the big one. And then he goes 
that's the big thing he told me. He goes -- I go what's that? 
He goes, the five to life, attempted aggravated attempted 
murder because that's the one we're going to focus on. So he 
came here today, from my knowledge, prepared to fight the 
attempted aggravated murder. 
THE COURT: Could I stop you for just one second only 
because you are starting to invade the attorney/client 
privilege and tell me things that are privileged and that 
nobody ever has a right to know, and that you ought to be 
careful about that? If there's a conflict, if at the end of 
the day there is a conflict, you are going to get another 
lawyer that you can disclose all this to and can decide what to 
disclose and what not to disclose. You can tell me if you want 
to. It's your privilege to waive. But you should know that 
you have that right. Okay? 
Now you are right to say that you brought this motion-
in front of me and that I've denied it. You know, I don't know 
if you recall, we had a hearing. We had a hearing for quite a 
while and at the end of the day, this is what I told you. 
18 
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Everybody is entitled to be represented by a lawyer under the 
constitution of the United States and in Utah. And 
particularly in this courtroom. I'11 guarantee that right 
without a question. 
But what you are not entitled to is if you can't 
afford a lawyer is a lawyer of your choosing. In order to do 
that you have to establish that there's good cause for that 
breakdown. 
And at the time when I denied that motion, 
Mr. Martinez, in my view and maybe I'm wrong and will be 
reversed on that, it won't be the first time I'm reversed and 
it won't be the last time I'm reversed. That's okay. I just 
call it like I see it. So but that's where it ends up. 
But right now you're in the middle of trial and it's 
not possible to just bring in two new lawyers in the middle of 
a trial. It may be that you use it as an argument for some 
appeal or ineffective assistance or whatever you want to call 
it, right, Mr. Tan? And new lawyers would be assigned that. 
Am I right about that? If there's a conflict which 
alleges deficient performance in any way, it would be perceived 
as a conflict. Your office will conflict that out and new 
MR. TAN: That is correct, your Honor. Our office 
policy would be that if there is a conflict, it -- I guess I 
should qualify it, there's a legitimate conflict even to a 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
point if it's just a personality conflict where the client and 
the attorney just cannot be able to get along, then the office 
would have a policy of conflicting the case to another legal 
defender. That was always the first preference. The 
alternative would be if that doesn't take care of the 
situation, the last resort would be to conflict the case 
outside of the office. 
And also just for the benefit of the record, in 
regards to what Mr. Martinez indicated about the conversation 
that I had with him, just so that the record is clear, should 
we need to refer to it in the future, I did not in any way 
refer to any of the statements that he made. That -- I think I 
never referred to it as counsel's (inaudible). What I did, in 
fact, inform Mr. Martinez is that Ms. Shreve and I are working 
on a motion to try to sever Count I from Count II. 
THE COURT: From the most significant -- sever the 
attempted murder from the other? 
MR. TAN: That's correct, but I did not promise --
THE COURT: We don't need to go into that. It may or 
may not be the basis for an appropriate motion in the future 
where there's new counsel. 
And Mr. Martinez, vou wouldp'fc "^ t-n^  f-iror T H I 
give you an example. I tried a very high profile murder case 
not too long ago, you might recall, where the husband was 
alleged to have run down his wife, to have directed the white 
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truck and run her down and everything. In very similar 
circumstances he was upset with counsel and new counsel came in 
and they brought before me the new trial motion and it was all 
evaluated. There!s a process to work through. 
I know for both victims, this has got to be 
incredibly frustrating because I know victims feel that at this 
point in the proceeding the criminal defendants get every 
right. I know from the criminal defendant's perspective this 
has to be very frustrating because you feel like, you know, you 
are getting railroaded at every turn. All I want to tell you 
is I'm doing the best I can with it, I'm going to continue to 
treat you with respect, and I hope you will afford me the 
courtesy of doing the same back and that we won't have that 
kind of interchange that we had yesterday. 
Okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't agree with what you are 
doing. 
THE COURT: I respect that you do not agree with what 
I am doing. I'll even acknowledge that I may make mistakes. 
All I'm telling you is I'm doing what I think is correct under 
the law. Okay? 
All right. So I believe we're at the point of 
calling our next witness. 
Having said you don't agree with what I am doing, I 
guess I would back up a question and say, what is it that you 
21 
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1 want me to do? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Well, it's like the lady comes in 
3 here that works here. She comes in here and tells Patrick out 
4 there, there's two officers that are out there sitting there 
5 talking about the case with another female out there. They 
6 all -- they work here how many years, 14 years and attended how 
7 many trials? They know they are not supposed to be talking 
8 about the trial or anything concerning this case out there in 
9 the hallways. And none of that is brought to his attention. 
10 He was brought up on the stand. Mr. Tan didn't even asked him. 
11 THE COURT: That's not actually true. Right? 
12 Ms. Richards was brought in in front of me and questioned. And 
13 I try to figure out at what level it happens. Is it a high 
14 I level that is going to require sanctions and it's going to 
15 I involve me imposing contempt sanctions or referring them to the 
16 bar, or is it a low level? I mean you got to do triage. You 
17 got to kind of -- your counsel immediately brought it to my 
18 attention. That other lawyer waited, right? That person came 
19 in and was questioned. So they're -- again, you say you don't 
20 agree with what I'm doing, but you are not telling me what it 
21 is you are asking me to do. 
22 | THE DEFENDANT: I already asked you I need new 
23 counsel, ineffective counsel. 
24 THE COURT: You did --
25 THE DEFENDANT: Other than that --
77 
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THE COURT: Yes, I did. 
THE DEFENDANT: I have a right, you know, to a fair 
trial. And I don't believe I'm being represented to the 
fullest like they say -- like to be represented. So I have, 
you know, problem in (inaudible.) 
THE COURT: You filed a new motion. Filed a motion 
for new/counsel which was denied. Are you looking for new 
counsel now? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And what would the basis be? 
THE DEFENDANT: Ineffective counsel. 
THE COURT: Well, based upon what? 
.. THE DEFENDANT: My lawyers, they feel intimidated by 
me, so, therefore, we have a conflict of interest. So 
therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever their 
'complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between 
me and the lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you 
know, communicate without me feeling that there's a fear 
between me and them. 
THE COURT: Mr. Tan, do you believe that you can 
vigorously represent this Defendant? 
THE COURT: Do you feel you can vigorously represent 
this Defendant? 
MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor, I can. 
23 
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THE COURT: Thank you. Where's Ms. Shreve? 
Are your concerns such -- I mean, Mr. Tan, you're a 
public defender. You have to run into situations where you are 
confronted with people that intimidate you. I'm not suggesting 
that you have. I don't want to get you (inaudible) -- but have 
people actually intimidated you or tried to intimidate you, 
whatever, have you been able to zealously advocate for them? 
MR. TAN: Yes, I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is any of this going to affect your 
ability to act as a zealous advocate? 
MR. TAN: No, your Honor, I'm still ready to go 
forward. 
THE COURT: Ms. Shreve, are you able to act as a 
zealous advocate of this matter? 
MS. SHREVE: I am, your Honor. Absolutely. 
THE COURT: I know that they've indicated that they 
have felt intimidated by some of that, but I also don't know --
if that's a result -- one, if it's a result of your own 
conduct, I don't think that you get to recreate the situation 
in which you get new counsel by doing that. 
Two, if it's just a misperception, I don't have the 
sense from counsel that they are not capable of fully 
performing. 
Do you have any specifics for me? Other than what 
we've talked about. 
OA 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I have specifics. I brought 
the conduct to your attention for --of conflict of interest 
and ineffective counsel. I talked to Charity and got Mr. Tan's 
attention about filing a motion to suppress evidence on Officer 
McPhie and another officer, I forgot his name, that they had 
illegally obtained statements from my father --
THE COURT: We've talked about this. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, you just asked me if I had 
any -- you know you just asked me --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I asked a bad question. 
Anything different than when we've talked about it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, there is something different. 
I just told you. There's another thing what he told me we were 
going to be fighting one case at a time, not globalizing. So 
from my knowledge and what I know, Mr. Tan and Charity, they 
came here to prepare to fight an attempted aggravated murder, 
not the robbery. We was totally being -- I was told we were 
fighting one case at a time. And we come here. Yesterday we 
start trial and it's all brought in all together. 
THE COURT: Well, they did move -- first of all, it's 
not up to them. It's up to me. And they did move to sever 
those counts and argue that they be severed. And, in fact, 
part of the motion was granted. Any of the threats that were 
made or the nonpayment or what have you, threats is the wrong 
word, but any of the nonpayments involving the first stop, I 
25 
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threw all of those out based on the arguments of your counsel. 
And, in fact, that's why Ms. Johnson had to dance around those 
questions with the witness. I denied it with respect to the 
second part. So the motion was granted in part and denied in 
part. 
THE DEFENDANT: When did I come to court to hear 
about it? I was never hear to hear nothing about that motion 
being filed. He just told me yesterday. And I asked him, I 
wrote him a list to (inaudible) I asked him. I wrote it down 
on there, why are all these being brought together when you 
told me one we would fight them one at a time? He goes, oh, 
there's a new law that just came in the other day and we'll be 
able to file a motion on that. 
THE COURT: You know, I'll look at the record, but 
I'll virtually guarantee he was present during argument, wasn't 
he? 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, I know vividly that he was 
because five minutes later Ms. Shreve asked to switch seats 
with him. 
THE COURT: That he was present at the time that we 
argaed the motion to sever? Any question about it? 
MS. SHREVE: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Stop pulling my leg then 
Mr. Lopez, you were here. What am I saying, Mr. Lopez -- I'm 
sorry, Mr. Martinez, you were present at the time it was 
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argued. 
You know, every time you say something like that — 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't recall it. 
THE COURT: You don't recall -- well, that's a 
different story. Let's go forward. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'll agree to go forward with this 
counsel. 
THE COURT: I'm not giving you a choice. Your motion 
is denied. You have the right at the end --
THE DEFENDANT: So you are violating my 
constitutional rights --
THE COURT: I don't, I don't believe --
THE DEFENDANT: '---"to a fair trial. 
THE COURT: I don't believe that I am. And the other 
thing I'm trying to tell you is that you have not only appeal 
rights but rights to ask for a new trial. We finish the trial. 
If you believe that things are done inappropriately, including 
all these things that you've alleged, you have the right to 
come back and ask for a new trial, and people have done that. 
You are being very difficult, Mr. Martinez. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's my life that's on the line, ' 
THE COURT: I'm not telling you that it's not. I'm 
telling you that I've tried -- you know, there are a couple of 
hundred jury cases, and I'm telling you that you are being as 
difficult a defendant as any I have encountered in the couple 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hundred jury cases that I have dealt with. 
Are you trying to stare me down, Mr. Martinez? For 
the record, are you trying to stare me down? 
THE DEFENDANT: I was looking at you while you are 
talking. 
THE COURT: Are you trying to stare me down, 
Mr. Martinez? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm just looking at you while you are 
talking. That's all. (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: How about in the back? Is that what's 
going on? Sir? 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Grinning. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I'm not. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Are we ready to go forward? 
MS. JOHNSON: The State is, your Honor. 
MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Call your next witness but don't -- yes, 
thank you. Don't you think we ought to have a jury first? 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Sorry sir. I apologize to you in the back. 
MS. JOHNSON: And your Honor, based on that previous 
conversation, I may have to take a phone call. So if I leave, 
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I apologize to the Court. 
THE COURT: I had told -- I don't know if you heard 
me, I told Ms. Shreve and Mr. Tan earlier, the two of you ought 
to feel free to come and go. The fact you like, so you don't 
feel like you are disrespecting the jury, I'm going to let them 
know you have witnesses out in the hallway, what have you, and 
at times it's necessary for counsel to get up and walk outside. 
And that they are not trying to be rude, but rather than 
interrupt the proceedings, we'll just have you come and go as 
necessary. 
All rise. You may be seated. 
Good morning everybody. Get a good night's sleep? 
Ready to go? I got some yes, some no. That's a good answer. 
We're ready to get proceeded with day two of the trial in this 
matter. 
I've been off coffee for a week, so I haven't been 
able to speak very well. 
Call your next witness please -- one minute. 
It occurred to me yesterday that there are times when 
the lawyers have gotten up and left the jury room -- or the 
courtroom. I want you to understand that there are witnesses 
that are in the hallway that we keep out there so they don't 
hear other witness's testimony. And at times it may be 
necessary for a lawyer to get up and go outside to do whatever 
they have to do. I' ve asked them not to interrupt the 
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every opportunity to ask for it for a curative instruction. 
You said no. I asked you if you wanted me to bring them back 
and talk to them at length about anything else. You said no. 
MR. TAN: The concern would be, your Honor, it was --
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. TAN: The concern would be, your Honor, it really 
does put us in a tough position because it's a catch-22. We 
focus on it, I think it would draw negative attention. If we 
don't --
THE COURT: Denied. 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, the final thing would be then 
whether the Defendant Julio Martinez will be taking the stand 
or not. I had a chance to talk to Mr. Martinez in the holding 
cell and I indicated to him both that he has the right to take 
the stand today and testify, and at the same time I also 
indicated to him that he has the right not to take the stand 
and incriminate himself. 
He asked for my opinion, and I indicated to 
Mr. Martinez what my opinion is. Without disclosing any trial 
strategy at this point, it's my understanding that Mr. Martinez 
will not be taking the stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Martinez, you have an absolute 
privilege to take the stand. And I would instruct the jury 
that just because you've been charged with the crime is no 
reason for treating your testimony any differently than any 
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other witness. 
Alternative, you absolutely have a privilege not to 
testify or say anything that may tend to incriminate you. And 
I will instruct the jury that they are to draw no adverse 
inference from the fact that you did not testify. Do you 
understand that? Do you understand what I just said? 
MR. TAN: Can you answer the Judge? 
THE COURT: Yes. All right. Do'y°u have any 
questions for me? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Is it your intent not to testify? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you intend to call any 
witnesses? 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, we'd like to.briefly recall 
Gabriel Martinez. 
THE COURT: All right. Bring in the jurors. 
Now are you thinking clearly, Mr. Martinez, today? 
Have you consumed any alcohol or illicit substances that may 
affect your judgment? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not today, no. 
THE COURT: Not that you know of? 
THE DEFENDANT: I said not today, no. 
THE COURT: Not today? Recently? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. Not even yesterday, no. 
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THE COURT: You feel like you are thinking clearly 
today? Do you suffer from any condition for which you receive 
treatment, physical, mental, or emotional condition? No? You 
need to answer out loud for me. I'm sorry. 
THE DEFENDANT: Right now? Are you talking about 
present, like right now? 
THE COURT: Yeah, do you suffer from anything, 
physical, mental or emotional? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you been prescribed any 
medications you are not taking? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: All right. So you feel like you are 
thinking clearly? You've had a chance to talk to counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Martinez, what's the highest 
level of education that you've had? 
THE DEFENDANT: Eleventh grade. 
THE COURT: And you clearly read, speak and write 
English? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And understand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Jury enters the courtroom.) 
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MR. FERBRACHE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: May this witness be released? 
MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. FERBRACHE: I have no objection to that. 
THE COURT: You are free to go young man. Thank you 
very much. 
I'm going to excuse you members of the jury one more 
time. Out you go. Remember what I told you. Don't talk about 
the case with anyone including each other until it is submitted 
to you for your deliberations. 
(Jury exits the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
Mr. Martinez, I wanted to give you one more 
opportunity to make the decision of whether or not to testify. 
Mr. Martinez, I want to give you one more opportunity 
to make a decision about whether to testify or not to testify. 
You've indicated that no one is forcing you not to testify. Is 
that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Nobody is forcing me. 
THE COURT: Are you making the decision not to 
testify of your own volition? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am making that decision. 
THE COURT: Of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would you like any more time to speak to 
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1 your lawyers about i t ? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
3 THE COURT: Would you like any more time to speak 
4 with anyone about it? Would you like the evening to think 
5 about it? 
6 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, if the record would reflect 
7 he shook his head no. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. The record should reflect 
9 that he's indicating in the negative to all of these. 
10 All right. And as I said before, you have an 
11 absolute right to testify. And if you did, I would carefully 
12 instruct the jury that they are to draw no adverse that is --
13 strike that. I would tell them that your testimony is entitled 
14 to be treated as anybody else's. And just because you are 
15 I accused of a crime is no reason for rejecting your testimony. 
16 Do you understand that? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
18 THE COURT: Do you understand that you also have this 
19 absolute privilege under our constitution not to testify, and 
20 that if you elect not to testify, I will inform the jury that 
21 they are to draw no adverse, that is no negative inference from 
22 the fact that you did not testify? Does that make sense to 
23 you? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me about 
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your right to testify? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you believe that up made a fully 
informed decision? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you are electing not to? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You intend to call any more witnesses? 
MS. SHREVE: No. 
MR. TAN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to bring the jurors in at this 
point in time. I'm going to indicate that the State -- I mean 
the defense has rested. 
Does the State have any rebuttal? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor. 
•THE COURT: Then I'm going to indicate to them that 
the evidence portion is closed. I'm going to release them for 
the evening, bring them back at 9:00 o'clock. Bring you back 
at 8:00 o'clock. 
I have a brief telephone conference at nine, another 
one of those ten second things, but between eight -- actually 
let's say 8:30, between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock we'll hammer out 
the jury instructions. Is that okay? 
MS. JOHNSON: Well, your Honor, I was -- frankly I 
was thinking the only hard thing is reading the instructions 
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And as I've indicated several times already, the 
State believes that the evidence supports the findings I ask of 
you. 7-Eleven surveillance video, the 911 recording, the 
testimony from all of the witnesses, the wounds, they all 
support only one conclusion, and that's guilty, guilty of 
attempted homicide. And the evidence supports guilty of 
robbery, guilty of domestic violence in the presence of 
children, Gabe and Isaiah, and interference with an arrest. 
Mr. Tan will have the opportunity to speak with you, 
and after he does, I will again briefly speak about the intent 
in this case. 
MR. TAN: Your Honor, if I may have just a few 
minutes to set some things up. 
THE COURT: You may, of course. 
MR. TAN: If I may proceed, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR.TAN: 
Good morning, members of the jury. On behalf of 
Julio Martinez, Ms. Shreve, I want to thank you for taking your 
time out of your schedule for two days, going into the third 
dav where I'm sure I can describe maybe some of the thoughts 
that you are having in the last few days. You've heard a lot 
of testimony from witnesses. You have seen a lot of evidence 
presented. I think it's safe to say that it's been a shocking 
Closinq Arqument by MR.TAN 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
experience, probably weren't anticipating if you were called 
for jury duty that you'd be listening to a case where it's as 
bloody as what you've heard in the last two days. It's a 
shocking experience and I know doubt can assume that it was 
also a very emotional day, emotional two days for some of you. 
And I think, finally, probably been exhausting an experience 
for all of us. 
I also notice that as some of you were listening to 
testimony of the evidence, you took some notes. To me that's 
good. The judge read you some instructions on note taking. I 
know that I can't cover everything in the last two days within 
the last --or within half an hour. I know the State probably 
as well can't cover everything. So I would invite you as you 
deliberate to talk about the case, the evidence, the testimony 
and deliberate using some of the notes that you took. 
I want to first of all talk about Teresa, Teresa 
Martinez and the evidence that you've heard, the 911 call. 
Are you able to play that again? 
MS. JOHNSON: If you have the exhibit. 
MR. TAN: That's fine. I would prefer that we rather 
not play the 911 call. It is what it is. There is no need to 
add insult to Teresa's injuries. 
In the 911 tape as you recall on Monday, you heard a 
very emotional Teresa Martinez. She was crying, she was in a 
lot of pain, she was screaming, she was yelling for help. 
Closing Argument by MR.TAN 21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Frankly, she is entitled to all those emotions because of what 
happened. It shouldn't have happened. There's no dispute 
about that. To play the 911 tape again, I think, is just going 
to add insult to the obvious and interest. 
We also have, and you will be taking this back with 
you as you deliberate, a lot of photographs. I'm not going to 
go over all these exhibits because, once again, I think they 
speak for themself. Going from top to bottom with these 
photographs, as Teresa indicated as she testified, she has 
scratches on the head. Also, from Teresa's testimony and also 
Dr. Duffy's testimony, she also had injuries to her left arm I 
believe and also her left leg, her arm and leg also. You'll 
see it in the photographs. 
There's also been testimony about how many times this 
may have happened. It's obvious, it's undisputed that this was 
not a one-time stabbing, that she didn't just get stabbed once 
nor twice. Dr. Duffy testified when he evaluated her at the 
emergency room, he noted that there were seven injuries. 
There's also been testimony from other witnesses as 
to eight stab wounds, nine. I think someone mentioned 15. 
Teresa testified it felt like 20. But we can only imagine 
whether it be nine or 20, the seconds between each of the 
stabbings probably felt like an eternity. 
There's also been some statements that the State 
pointed out that Mr. Martinez may have made. I think most of 
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1 these statements came from Gabriel Martinez, who I agree, 
2 shouldn't have had to take the stand to testify, at a young 
3 age, having to do that, having to be an adult, take over a 
4 situation that should never happened to him. 
5 I'm sure that Gabriel Martinez did hear some 
6 statements that his father made as this unfortunate event 
7 happened. It may be this is what I am going to do to in terms 
8 of Teresa Martinez. It may be I'm going to kill you for F'ing 
9 my brother. I'm sure there were statements that Gabriel heard. 
10 We don't know for sure how accurate some of these statements 
11 may be. I'm not going to nitpick the words to Gabriel's 
12 testimony. It was a very traumatic experience for this young 
13 child. And he's trying his best to recall that day, May 5th, 
14 2009. It's not easy for him, I'm sure. 
15 The testimony from Gabriel about after the stabbing, 
16 his father went to 7-Eleven, saw his father at 7-Eleven, we 
17 know that that probably is not fully accurate. He rray have got 
18 that information elsewhere because as the officers testified 
19 the house was not exactly next to 7-Eleven. It was nothing to 
20 look out the window, see his dad going to the 7-Eleven parking 
21 lot. It was a little bit away. But for a young child that is 
22 what we render. And like I said, there's no doubt he remembers 
23 some statements that way. 
24 People make bad decisions. Sometimes they'll let 
25 their emotions get the best of them. And because of those bad 
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decisions and emotions, sometimes we regret, we feel sorry. If 
life was easy, if life was like a VCR, a CD. player, go back 
and change things, rewind things, I'm sure we would. 
I will tell you right now that Julio Martinez made 
some bad decisions. We have heard those bad decisions. He 
went to the bar and drank. He had a Tequila bottle that Teresa 
testified was not hers found at the crime scene, it was empty. 
You can assume why it was empty and he had consumed Tequila. 
We know that based on the alcohol from the bar, the 
alcohol from the Tequila bottle, and that was Teresa's own 
statements when she testified in regards to when Julio came 
over and then she talked a little bit about him going to the 
bar. And one of the questions asked and her answer was 
something in the nature of, well, he wanted to stay over, sleep 
over. I allowed it because I didn't think it was a good idea 
for him to drive. 
That was the mental condition of Julio. He was 
drunk. He was intoxicated. He was probably so intoxicated and 
we even heard Jose Jimenez indicate, yeah, he appeared drunk to 
me. There's no dispute about that. He was probably so 
intoxicated, he probably didn't know what he intended to do the 
next minute, maybe even the next second. 
And, of course, emotions. It's always a bad 
combination when you consume alcohol and it doesn't do good 
things for you. There are happy drunks, I guess, and there's 
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some angry drunks. Emotions. Julio also let his emotions get 
the best of him. 
I think that's the testimony about the marriage going 
bad and the process of possibly divorcing, separating Teresa 
and the kid that sometimes she'd go for months without talking 
to Julio, sometimes for days without talking to him. And you 
know that this is not a happy marriage, which is unfortunate. 
We also know from some testimony that he was having 
some feelings again about the death of one of his siblings, his 
brother. So yes, there's a lot of things going on inside of 
Julio. 
I want to now shift gears and talk about jury 
instructions. I believe the jury instructions -- I'm going to 
kind of go backwards here. For my purposes I think it will be 
easier. <:.., .. 
I want to refer to Jury Instruction No. 47, 
interference with an arresting officer. I want to save all of 
us some time. I would save Mr. Ferbrache some time. No. 5, 
interference of a police officer. He's guilty. You can check 
that off. 
Going backwards, Jury Instructions No. 44 and 43, 
which are pretty identical except for the name Gabriel Martinez 
and Isaiah Martinez. I list three and four on the chart. It's 
not an.issue. Julio Martinez is guilty of that as well. Just 
save sometime. 
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I do want to find out, however, in referring to 
Instructions No. 43 and 44. Element No. 2, that the Defendant 
committed domestic violence, attempted criminal homicide, or 
intentionally caused serious bodily injury for use of a 
dangerous weapon against (inaudible.) I'm going to submit to 
you on guilty three and four based on intentionally causing 
serious bodily, bodily injury or use a dangerous weapon against 
a co-habitant. I will come back to the other possibility, 
committed domestic violence, attempted criminal homicide. 
Now I want to go to Instruction No. 41. It's the 
robbery. As the State indicated this is in reference to some 
gas at 7-Eleven. We've heard testimony from Jose Jimenez that 
indicated that Julio didn't have permission to take the gas. 
Julio was trying to do it illegal, by force. 
At the same time there are jury instructions that 
will defer to the credibility of a witness. I'm not trying to 
single out Jose Jimenez, but one thing that stands out about 
Jose as we were comparing the case, compared to other 
witnesses, is that Jose Jimenez does have a criminal history, 
felony. He was on probation at the time. He had a probation 
officer. That job was important to him. 
Ms. Shreve asked Jose Jimenez in regards to his job 
when you follow all the rules, all the policies of 7-Eleven, 
you don't get in trouble, you lose your job, and you lose your 
job, you get in trouble. The question then becomes, and I 
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would invite you to deliberate and talk amongst yourselves, did 
Jose Jimenez have some type of motivation to testify what he 
did. Did he have a dog in a fight? 
That leaves us with what I left blank. I left this 
one because this is one decision, an important decision where I 
ask each of you to think about what should No. 1 be? Now, I 
will tell you right now, there's no dispute in regard to what 
happened. Julio stabbed Teresa multiple times. The question 
then becomes is he guilty -- (inaudible) is he guilty of 
attempted criminal homicide, is one of the options; or is he 
guilty of domestic violence and aggravated assault that causes 
serious bodily injury, option No. 2; or 3, is he guilty of 
aggravated assault using a dangerous weapon? There's option 
No. 4 on the road map as you would call it, Instruction No. 34 
is a road map. There's also then the fourth possibility which 
would be you find Julio Martinez not guilty to Count No. I. 
It's not going to happen. 
So each of you will be making just one decision as I 
indicated, but a very important decision. And as my colleague, 
Ms. Shreve indicated in her opening statement back early Monday 
morning we ask that you keep an open mind and I hope you have 
as you absorbed all of the testimony and the evidence. We also 
ask and continue to ask that you set aside your emotions 
because some of the testimony is hard to take. We're all human 
beings, we have feelings, we have emotions, but we ask you try 
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to be, try to set aside some of those emotions. 
What we do ask from you is the jury instructions, 
read them, discuss them amongst yourselves, their explanations 
of various terms to help you guide, to help guide you as far as 
you make that decision. So in essence we ask that you try to 
set aside your emotions as hard as that might be, just follow 
what is on the jury instructions, what the judge has read to 
you. 
I'm not going to harp too much on some of the legal 
terms. I want to first of all talk about the burden of proof. 
I think that's as the State indicated the burden of proof is on 
the State. I think the State also indicated that they are 
excited and thrilled that that burden is on them. They feel 
good. They feel they have a strong case. 
It is the law that the burden of proof is on the 
State.' They must prove to you, each of you beyond a reasonable 
doubt about what happened. 
And Mr. Ferbrache was quite confident about that 
burden of proof. He thinks each of you will come back and find 
Julio Martinez guilty of attempted criminal homicide. 
Representing the State, Mr. Ferbrache has a zealous 
duty to do the job. At the same time we have a duty to present 
to you alternatives on the other side of what happened. 
There's always two sides of every story. 
There's a possibility, and that's the question for 
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1 you, that's why we have a road map, Instruction No. 34, did the 
2 State overcharge Julio Martinez? Why do we have lesser 
3 included options? It wouldn't be in there if it wasn't for the 
4 possibility that maybe overzealousness, overcharging. Did that 
5 happen? That's one question I would ask you take when you 
6 deliberate. 
7 This is my last opportunity to talk to you. I'm 
8 going to sit back down when I am done and then the State will 
9 come back and they get to do what's called rebuttal. In other 
10 words, putting it plainly, because the burden of proof is on 
11 the State, they get the last word. 
12 And I think the focus then, I'm not going to speak on 
13 their behalf, I think the focus of their rebuttal will be then 
14 on whether it is an attempted homicide. There's no need to 
15 I talk about three, four or five. 
16 Attempted criminal homicide, when you think about it 
17 } what comes to mind? Think of criminal homicide. I have a 
18 loaded gun, I know it's late, I'm not happy with someone, I 
19 point the gun at them, shoot them. I know this gun is capable 
20 easily of killing someone. I've fired a gun, shot the person, 
21 the vital area of your body. They survive, they are paralyzed, 
22 attempted criminal homicide. 
23 A knife, let's use another example, another deadly 
24 weapon, a knife. I have a knife. I'm not happy with someone. 
25 And I go stab them on the chest in a critical area. Some of 
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this came out from the testimony of Dr. Duffy, vital areas, 
given chances to kill. Once again, they survived, that's 
attempted criminal homicide. 
The question then is did Julio do what he did with a 
pair of scissors, granted stabbing Teresa multiple times? Even 
making some statements, this is what you get. There were 
scratches on her head. She had some wounds on her left arm. 
She had "wounds on her left leg. Is that what you think of when 
you think of attempted criminal homicide, or is it a 
possibility of an aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon? 
I'm going to get to that jury instruction in a few minutes. 
I also want to mention that I will be referring to 
Dr. Duffy's testimony and his notes as well. 
But let's go and talk about Jury Instruction No. 45. 
There are two parts to this jury instruction, just like all the 
other jury instructions. You have to have a mental intent and 
the act itself. So before you can find Julio Martinez guilty 
of Instruction No. 35, attempted criminal homicide, the law is 
you must be satisfied, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
not only was the act there, but also the intent. 
I think when the State comes back and talk about 
during their rebuttal, I think the focus will be on intent. I 
want to focus on that as well. 
There's no hiding and there's no dispute, and I would 
refer then to Instruction, Jury Instruction No. 49. Voluntary 
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intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is 
an element of the offense. Talk about the facts as applied to 
this. 
Julio quite frankly was really drunk. We heard that 
Jose Jimenez who testified, yeah, he appeared drunk to me. We 
heard testimony from Teresa Martinez, as I indicated, he went 
to a bar and he drank alcohol. The Tequila bottle that was 
found at Teresa's house was empty. She felt that he was too 
drunk to even probably safely operate a vehicle. Trying to 
prevent him from drinking and driving, she allowed him to stay 
over. 
I also want to talk about the kitchen knife. We've 
heard from Teresa's testimony that earlier that night, I think 
maybe around 2:00 o'clock or so, Julio came over and they got 
into a discussion. It got emotional for him. Somehow he ended 
up knowing where that knife is in the kitchen, took that knife 
and stabbed himself. That's Teresa's testimony. You can take 
it for what it's worth, but let's assume that that's in fact 
what happened. That knife is a dangerous weapon. He knows 
where it is. He has access to that. If he wanted to kill her, 
wanted to commit a criminal homicide, why not use that knife? 
It has a blade. It's sharper. Cuts easier. Scissors, it has 
a sharp end, puncture wounds. Knife, you can slash. 
Let's talk about the scissor part, State's Exhibit 
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No. 7, it's found on the couch, lying on the couch in plain 
sight. Once again, let's go talk about the mental intent, 
criminal homicide. I try to kill someone, did I have the 
intent, was I coherent and I knew what I was doing and I 
intended to kill, I would not leave that weapon behind. It's 
there. Why would he -- if the goal was to kill her and then 
take off, he leaves that weapon in plain sight. That was the 
testimony of Officer Libertine. The picture is right there. 
We also heard from Officer Cowan that when he 
confronted Julio at the 7-Eleven, there were observations that 
he noted. Julio was pointing to his head and neck area, and he 
was agitated, and quite frankly, he was not making sense. Once 
again, goes towards the mental state. It did not make sense 
after. So then what is the intent, state of mind of Julio 
Martinez? 
I think the State will also mention Gabriel 
Martinez's statements again. I have no doubt that Gabriel 
Martinez heard something from his dad, something with regards 
to the stabbing. There's no doubt about that. But then he's a 
young child, this happened over a year ago. We can assume he 
heard something, something that dad said about what was 
happening, but what exactly was said, how accurate 
word-for-word? Because not to discredit this young child, but 
this young child also indicated that after this was all over, 
after this image finally stopped, he recalls seeing dad heading 
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off and getting to the 7-Eleven parking lot. 
And I think the State also indicated the intent to 
commit this criminal homicide was when Julio Martinez went to 
7-Eleven and only purchased two items, a pair of scissors and 
some cigarettes. Now keeping in mind that 7-Eleven is not 
exactly Walmart, they have a limited supply of what they can 
sell, they can offer, obviously he wasn't going there to get 
more beer or to get a slurpee, but, yes, he did purchase a pair 
of scissors and some cigarettes. 
We can speculate if in fact that's the law. It's not 
the law. But we can speculate as indicated and, say, well 
bought the scissors to use to try to kill Teresa. At the same 
time you can say we can speculate, bought the scissors, the 
cigarettes. Some people have certain habits that they do as 
far as smoking. I'm not a smoker myself. I'm not going to go 
into details about maybe how the scissors relate to the 
cigarettes, but we do know that certain people have certain 
patterns when it comes to smoking cigarettes. 
But the other thing that I notice when Mr. Ferbrache 
was giving his closing remarks was Teresa having to probably 
crawl to the door within the house and locking it. Also the 
purpose why I think the State pointed out is so that, as 
Mr. Ferbrache indicated, the Defendant didn't come back and 
finish the job. That is interesting. I didn't think about 
this last night, but I thought about it as I was hearing this. 
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Once again, it goes to the intent of Julio Martinez. 
Now if the intent is to kill her, why didn't we have 
any testimony? Why is there no evidence he did try to come 
back and finish the job? Why didn't we hear anything from 
Gabriel or Teresa, yeah, let's point that out, the door was 
locked, he came back, he was pounding on it and he tried to get 
in and he gave up and left again. No, he did not. 
There's also been talked about the act itself, the 
injuries. Are these injuries consistent with an attempted 
criminal homicide? Are they fatal or did they create and 
resulted in substantial bodily injury? 
Now as I indicated in reference to Count No. I, 
there's a road map, Instruction No. 34, and it kind of guides 
you. One option would be the domestic violence, attempted 
criminal homicide. Another option is domestic violence, 
aggravated assault, substantial bodily injury. Third one is 
domestic violence, aggravated assault. Using force or a 
dangerous weapon. And obviously no door (inaudible.) 
Working once again from head to toe based on the 
pictures and the testimony, the scratches, you can see from the 
pictures and Teresa also referred to her head and use of word 
scratches, yes, she did sustain injuries. Were they 
substantial, these scratches? Were they substantial bodily 
injuries? Were they life threatening? 
Moving down, let's talk about the arm. She had to 
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1 have surgery on the arm. I think that is definitely a 
2 substantial bodily injury. 
3 Let's talk about the leg. Some pretty gruesome 
4 pictures of the leg and the two wounds there, the two deep 
5 J wounds. Definitely substantial boldly injury from the 
6 scissors. No doubt about that. Once again, does it amount to 
7 I an attempted homicide? 
8 As Dr. Duffy indicated, there were no injuries to the 
9 chest area where the heart would be, no injuries to the neck, 
10 no injuries to the abdomen. 
11 We also know from some of the testimony minor details 
12 but nevertheless just to point it out, one of the officers 
13 decided to put AirMed on standby. Now if it was serious, life 
14 threatening, everyone would have showed up, everyone would have 
15 taken Teresa to the hospital. It was on standby, the 
16 helicopter was on standby, but she was transported by ambulance 
17 to the hospital. Once again, does that amount to substantial 
18 bodily injury (inaudible) or dangerous weapon or is it 
19 attempted criminal homicide? 
20 I would like to just refer to some of Dr. Duffy's 
21 I testimony. This is the State's expert witness. This is the 
22 witness that the State called, not one that we found. This is 
23 the doctor that treated Teresa at the emergency room, evaluated 
24 her. He indicated that his ABC's are stable. 
25 Physical exam, generally she was awake, alert, 
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oriented, conversant. 
HEENT appeared normal. Neck normal. Lungs clear. 
Heart sounds normal. Abdomen soft, which I asked is that a 
good sign? Yes. Extremities, no. 
His assessment, Dr. Duffy's assessment, seven wounds 
all together. I think he pointed out two on the left upper 
knee area, one on the armpit there. I think that was the 
.5-centimeter one. And then it looks like three wounds on her 
left hand. 
Once again, the doctor noted the patient as awake, 
alert, oriented and does not appear to have sustained serious 
bodily injuries. 
Going towards the testimony of Teresa Martinez as 
you've heard and also when you -- not when you heard what she 
said, but you saw how she said it. It was obvious she was in 
love with Julio when this happened. She was crying. She was 
yelling. She was screaming. She's entitled to all of that. 
It's not fun when you get stabbed. 
At the same time we know that she was alert, she was 
awake, she was conversant. Point this out, it's not a good 
thing, not a good thing for Julio, but point it out 
nevertheless she talked to Gabe, instructed Gabe what to do to 
get help. 
She talked to officers afterwards to make sure that 
the kids are okay. She talked with Kami Sandoval, gave some 
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1 instructions to Kami. Once again, she had serious bodily 
2 injuries, but these were not life threatening. Otherwise she 
3 probably wouldn't be able to do this hours later. 
4 I want to go back then to my chart here. I want to 
5 focus now on domestic violence, aggravated assault, SBI, 
6 substantial bodily injury. That is one the options 
7 (inaudible). There's also a specific jury instruction in 
8 regards to that. 
9 Frankly, I don't think Option No. 2 meets and fits 
10 the facts here. We're missing some important information. 
11 That jury instruction does not mention anything about a 
12 dangerous weapon. That jury instruction does not talk about or 
13 does not have language about life is death, or substantial 
14 bodily injury. So I want to talk about then this jury 
15 instruction right here, domestic violence, aggravated assault, 
16 using unlawful force or a dangerous weapon. I'm going to go 
17 through that. 
18 I believe this should be Instruction No. 36. 
19 Actually it's not Instruction No. 36, it is the one before 
20 that, Instruction No. 35. Before you can convict the 
21 Defendant, Julio Martinez, of the crime of domestic violence 
22 } attempted criminal -- okay. Let .me find the right one first. 
23 Okay. Instruction No. 39, before you can convict the 
24 Defendant, Julio Inez Martinez, of the crime of lesser included 
25 offense of domestic violence, aggravated assault, using force 
Closing Arqument bv MP TZ\TVT Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or dangerous weapon, you must find from all the evidence the 
following elements. There are four. 
I would invite you to apply the facts and the 
testimony and the evidence on what you heard the last two days 
to these elements. 
, On or about May 5th, 2009, in Salt Lake County, all 
that's been established. There's no doubt about that. 
Element No. 2, the Defendant intentionally or 
knowingly or recklessly goes and talks about the mental state. 
Notice if you will, the first option, domestic violence, 
attempted criminal homicide, one element I mentioned intent, it 
is intentionally. You'll have the documents to consider. 
Instruction No. 39 gives you an option to consider 
the possibility of knowingly recklessly. How drunk.was he? 
Was he acting reckless? 
Third element, which I think would be appropriate, 
talks about a dangerous weapon. That said Defendant did then 
and there use a dangerous weapon, the scissors. Or such other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. Gives you some options there. 
Likely to produce death. Yes, he didn't go for the 
jugular. Pretty serious. But yes, if unattended, if Gabe 
didn't step in and make the call, gave the right information, 
the paramedics showed up, she could have bled to death. Likely 
to produce death from those wounds or serious bodily injury. 
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1 That is what we have, serious bodily injury. 
2 I want to then move to Instruction No. 36, with some 
3 definitions. What is an assault. What is defined as domestic 
4 violence. What constitutes (inaudible) what is a dangerous 
5 weapon? It's a very vast one. Serious bodily injury means 
6 voluntary injury that causes serious permanent disfigurement. 
7 Yeah, she'd have some scars. Protracted loss or impairment of 
8 a function of any bodily member or organ. Her fingers were 
. 9 numb. Or creates a substantial risk of death. Unfortunately 
10 yeah. 
11 I think instruction --or element No. 4, 
12 co-habitation is also met on this jury instruction. 
13 (Inaudible) assault, using unlawful force, dangerous 
14 weapon, co-habit, I don't think there are any issues, although 
15 some things did come up that the marriage was kind of on the 
16 border so to speak. Sometimes she would go, Teresa would go 
17 J not talk to Julio for months, sometimes for a couple of days 
18 but at the same time I think we can meet co-habitation because 
19 she also testified that even though sometimes she also not 
20 talking with him for months or even a couple of days, he was 
21 still driving her car. When he came over, I think she even 
22 allowed him at the beginning to lay next to her in the same 
23 bed. 
24 So finally, members of the jury, I would ask on 
25 behalf of Mr. Martinez, that although it might be hard try, to 
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set aside emotions. This was a -- not the more pleasant case 
to hear, emotionally, tears. Try to set aside those emotions 
if you can. Try to follow the law, the jury instructions. 
Because frankly, Julio let his emotions get the best of him. 
And frankly, Julio did not follow the law. 
I would ask that after deliberating you find Julio 
Martinez guilty on Count I, as domestic violence, aggravated 
assault using unlawful force or dangerous weapon, focus on 
those four elements that we stated, and please apply those to 
the facts and testimony. Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferbrache. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Thank you, your Honor, 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. FERBRACHE: 
I promise to be brief. I only want to address a few 
things Mr. Tan indicated or spoke about. Thank you. 
Drinking, going to the bar, there's no evidence that 
he was drunk. You saw him on the 7-Eleven surveillance video, 
he could walk. He wasn't running into the door. He could open 
the door just fine. He was driving around. He drove to 
Teresa's, he drove to 7-Eleven, he drove back. 
Officer Lucas Johnson testified that he spoke just 
fine to him. Julio was able to understand him when he was 
saying those things to her. He wasn't drunk (inaudible.) 
Mr. Tan said that there's no evidence of him coming 
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August 5, 2010 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
THE COURT: Good afternoon everyone. Who do I have 
on the phone? 
MR. FERBRACHE: Gregory Ferbrache for the State. 
MR. TAN: Patrick Tan for Mr. Martinez. 
THE COURTi All right. I heard yesterday that, as 
you know, I play --my clerk is Sam Goble who works at LDA, and 
Sam had let slip that yesterday when we were playing squash 
that Ms. Shreve was, not last night but the night before, 
followed home and had to alert the authorities. I don't know 
if it's related or not, but because of the nature of the case 
and the past allegations and with sentencing coming up, I 
thought that that was an appropriate disclosure for the record. 
MR. TAN: I would have to agree with that as well, 
Judge. 
MR. FERBRACHE: I'm sorry what? 
MR. TAN: I- would have to agree. I think that does 
become an issue. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it's an issue or 
not an issue. I leave that to whoever. I just --it's an 
appropriate disclosure for the record. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Did she report this incident? 
MR. TAN: She did call the Kaysville Police. 
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1 MR. FERBRACHE: Well, you are just saying -- and as 
2 Sandi indicated, if there is (inaudible) intimation it's a 
3 criminal -- that needs to be criminally investigated so let's 
4 look at it that way. I think she needs to report this. Does 
5 she have a case number? 
6 THE COURT: And I leave that entirely up to you. 
7 This is simply -- you know, this is a communication I received 
8 that may or may not relate to the case, but because of the 
9 allegations that had previously been made, I think out of an 
10 abundance of caution it's appropriate for me to place it on the 
11 record that that's what I had been told. 
12 MR. TAN: I think that's appropriate. Without 
13 Ms. Shreve being here, I don't have all the details as to --
14 THE COURT: I don't know anything other than that. 
15 There were no questions. I didn't ask. I immediately stopped 
16 it at that point. Don't know who it was, what it's related, 
17 J the outcome, anything like that, Mr. Tan. Only that I was 
18 informed that the night before it was alleged that somebody had 
19 followed her and that she had alerted the authorities. So --
20 MR. TAN: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: As I say related, unrelated I have no 
22 idea, but you both know how I am about disclosures hopefully by 
23 now. 
24 MR. TAN: Right. 
25 THE COURT: And always believe that that's, so. 
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MR. FERBRACHE: Patrick would you please have Charity 
contact me immediately. 
MR. TAN: She is on vacation, and I don't think she's 
going to be back until next week. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay. 
MR. TAN: I'd rather not bother her while she's on 
vacation if this is not urgent, that would be ray preference. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay. 
MR. TAN: And so -- but I definitely will bring it to 
her attention when she gets back in town next week --
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay. 
MR. TAN: -- SO. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay. And I'll talk to my office in 
the meantime, see what they suggest as well. 
THE COURT: Sure. That makes sense. 
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Goodbye everybody. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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